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REGULATION FOR THE SAKE OF APPEARANCE
Adam M. Samaha*
Appearance is often given as a justification for decisions, including government
decisions, but the logic of appearance arguments is not well theorized. This Article
develops a framework for understanding and evaluating appearance-basedjustifications
for government decisions. First, working definitions are offered to distinguish
appearancefrom reality. Next, certain relationshipsbetween appearance and reality are
singled out for attention. Sometimes reality is insulated from appearance, sometimes
appearance helps drive reality over time, and sometimes appearance and reality collapse
from the outset. Finally, sets of normative questions are suggested based on the
supposed relationship between appearance and realityfor a given situation. The subjects
of these normative questions include aesthetics, transparency concerns, and the
likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy. A closing section applies these ideas to prominent
debates over campaign finance regulation and broken windows policing. Leading
empirical studies are examined and, throughout, the Article draws from scholarship in
philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science.

Attention, comrades! ... We have won the battle for production!'
Backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.]2
At the tone, twenty hours, nine minutes, Coordinated Universal Time.3
INTRODUCTION

A

ppearance matters, and in more ways than one. Countless decisions are explained and justified by the resulting appearance and
not, or not only, by the resulting reality. Most people probably do not
leave home before considering how their physical appearance will influence the perceptions of others. Cosmetics and cosmetic surgery are

* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments and discussions, I thank Oren Bar-Gill, Ryan Bubb, Guy-Uriel Charles, Rosalind Dixon, Lee Fennell, Jake
Gersen, Clay Gillette, Tom Ginsburg, David Golove, Bernard Grofman, Rick Hills, Stephen
Holmes, William Hubbard, Aziz Huq, Sam Issacharoff, Dan Kahan, Brian Leiter, Daryl Levinson,
Anup Malani, Richard McAdams, Tom Miles, 'levor Morrison, Nate Persily, Rick Pildes, Ariel
Porat, Cathy Sharkey, Dan Shaviro, Pablo Spiller, Matthew Stephenson, Lior Strahilevitz, Jonathan
Wiener, and Sarah Woo. Thanks as well to workshop participants at Columbia (public law colloquium), Duke, N.Y.U., Tel Aviv (law and economics workshop), the University of Chicago, and
Yale (legal theory workshop). Adam Barber, Hanna Chung, Maxwell Kampfner, Mitha Rao, and
Emma Ruby-Sachs provided excellent research assistance. Mistakes are mine.
I GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 51 (Signet Classic ig6i) (1949).
2 From the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's logo, reproduced at 12 C.F.R. § 328.1
(201).

3 From the National Institute of Standards and Technology's radio broadcast, available by
telephone at 303-499-711x.

See History of WWV, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,

http://www.nist.gov/pml/div688/grp40/wwv-history.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
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multibillion dollar industries, after all,4 to say nothing of commercial
advertising and its image focus since before the i96os.. In fact, appearances help determine the health and survival of human institutions. If the importance of appearance was not clear much earlier, the
economic catastrophes of the Great Depression and the Great Recession underscored the reality. Confidence is a state of mind, and it influences behavior. Everything from a stable banking system to thriving religious organizations, successful undercover operations, and voter
turnout depends on it. It might not be exaggerating to say that the
primary goal of human institutions is maintaining various impressions.
Unsurprisingly, then, appearance-based justifications in law and
politics are common. Government officials regularly attempt to build
public confidence by taking care of appearances. An especially old example is the Bill of Rights. It was promoted partly for the comfort it
would give fair-minded critics of the new government, whose supporters
professed no interest in crossing these lines. James Madison said that
the amendments were offered "to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual." 6 An especially familiar example arises in
codes of judicial conduct. They obligate judges to recuse themselves
when their impartiality can be reasonably questioned, not only when it is
rightly questioned.' And especially controversial examples involve order maintenance policing and campaign finance regulation. For decades, academics and policymakers have debated whether the appearance of neighborhood disorder instigates serious crime, and whether
policing strategies.directed at otherwise minor crimes can change that
appearance and stop that dynamic.8 For an equally long time, supporters of campaign finance regulation have defended against court challenges by arguing that the money/politics relationship can be fashioned
to minimize both the appearance and the reality of corruption.9
Although the justification is familiar, the special logic of appearance arguments is not well theorized, particularly with respect to legal

4 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS 34-35 (2010) (stating that people in the
United States "spend[] more money on grooming than on reading material").
S See FIRST RESEARCH, INDUSTRY PROFILE: ADVERTISING & MARKETING SERVICES
2 (2011) (estimating annual revenue for advertising and marketing at $88 billion in the United
States); THOMAS FRANK, THE CONQUEST OF COOL 62-67 (1997) (describing Volkswagen's
ig60s advertising campaigns).
6 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 450 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 164-65 (977).
7 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, r.
2.1n(A) (2007); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266-67 (2009) (emphasizing the need for public confidence in the judiciary).
8 See infra section IVB, pp. 1620-34.
9 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 25-27, 46-48 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasizing public
confidence); see also infra section IV.A, pp. 1599-1619.
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institutions.10 Appearance arguments can be slippery and, often
enough, troublesome when asserted by those who claim to be working
for the public good. Consider campaign finance litigation. Courts
have validated a government interest in appearing noncorrupt without
much explanation of how or why it should matter. Are we supposed to
think that government is entitled to appear noncorrupt even if it is, in
fact, riddled with corruption? Are defenders of campaign finance laws
claiming to know that the government is basically free of corruption?
Is there anything more to the argument?
This Article confronts the potential and problematics of appearance
justifications. My principal aspiration is to build a general framework
for understanding and evaluating claims that a government decision is
justified because it will create a desirable appearance."
Decisions
within legal institutions are my focus, but the logic of appearance
management beyond government will be considered as well. Accordingly, I will offer some conceptual work to distinguish appearance
from reality, positive work to identify potential relationships between
10 Legal scholarship on appearance-based regulation is thick regarding law's expressive function, see sources cited infra note 66, and there is helpful work on law and aesthetics, see, e.g.,
RHODE, supra note 4; SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS (2oog); Robert Post, Prejudicial

Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. I (2ooo). A
broader perspective is mostly missing, although there are important contributions. For an argument for a deontological duty to appear ethical based on relational obligations, see Deborah
Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Government, and the Moral
Signficance of How Things Seem, 6o MD. L. REV. 653 (2005). A critical reply is Matthew D. Adler, Expression and Appearance: A Comment on Hellman, 60 MD. L. REV. 688 (2001). For an
analysis of how government might compete with private parties to reap benefits from manipulating people's misperceptions of risk, see Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law's Role in
ManipulatingPerceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006). Outside the law literature, a consequentialist account to which I am partial is Julia Driver, Caesar's Wife: On the Moral Significance of Appearing Good, 89 J. PHIL. 331, 341 (1992), which argues that actions that are not intrinsically immoral can be wrongful when they seem immoral and observers either are offended or
copy their misperception of the action. There are, of course, many pockets of appearance-related
legal scholarship. See, e.g., Larry D. Barnett, Law as Symbol: Appearances in the Regulation of
Investment Advisers and Attorneys, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 289 (2007); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1914 (2oso); cf Note, Satisfying the "Appearance of Justice": The Uses of Apparent Impropriety in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2708 (2004) (presenting a
taxonomy of statements about appearances in the Supreme Court's constitutional opinions).
11 I do not include prophylactic rules, which are norms that reach beyond bad conduct in order to help ensure that such conduct does not occur. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing
and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 1o8 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 515-17 (2oo8); David A. Strauss, The
Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 200, 204-o5 (1988). A leading reason to
tolerate such crude regulatory overbreadth is that the feared conduct is too difficult to detect and
therefore a (clear) proxy is adequate. This is old news. And although prophylactic rules do tend
to target conduct that merely resembles bad conduct, my interest is in decisions that are defended
in terms of the appearances that they are supposed to cause, not every decision that takes appearance into account. Prophylactic rules amount to regulation that applies to appearances, while I
am interested in regulation for the sake of generating appearances. The former does not raise the
same aesthetic, transparency, or causation questions.
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appearance and reality, and normative work to suggest key evaluative
questions that depend on those relationships. To illustrate these ideas,
I will apply them to two policies that otherwise have little in common:
campaign finance regulation and broken windows policing.
Part I of the Article discusses the concepts of appearance and reality. These ideas have a tangled heritage of many centuries, but a few
concise observations should suffice. Part II explores certain relationships between appearance and reality. Often, we think that appearance is a superficial version of reality with no causal impact on it. But
looks are not always deceiving. Under certain conditions, an initial
appearance will facilitate the emergence of a corresponding reality.
These self-fulfilling prophecies happen in banking, dating, democracy,
and elsewhere. And, of course, sometimes there is no important difference between an appearance and a reality of interest. Appearance can
be important for its own sake.
Part III uses this assortment of relationships to suggest evaluative
frameworks for appearance justifications. When there is no relevant
reality separate from appearance, normative evaluation is relatively
uncomplicated, even if observers disagree. When, instead, appearance
and reality might diverge, additional questions arise. With respect to
government decisions, appearance justifications often involve boosting
public confidence. One stock democratic concern about such efforts is
transparency: can officials defend a gap between what they appear to
be doing and what they are actually doing? Sometimes they can and
sometimes they cannot, and much has been written on that topic already. When a self-fulfilling prophecy is underway, however, the
transparency concern is basically eliminated. How things appear will
turn into how those things actually are. As such, the key normative
question moves from transparency to causation: what is the likelihood
of a self-fulfilling prophecy?
Part IV applies these ideas to ongoing debates over campaign
finance regulation (especially candidate contribution limits) and broken
windows policing (especially to reduce violent crime). Despite taking
place in different contexts and on different terms, both of these debates
involve appearance justifications, and both can be renovated using the
same general framework. The upshot is that the courtroom contest
over appearance in campaign finance regulation is both insufficiently
concerned about transparency and insufficiently curious about selffulfilling prophecies involving corruption, while the policy dispute over
broken windows policing suffers from something like the opposite
problem. Scholarly effort on broken windows theories has thus far
yielded evidence of modest or zero impact on serious crime, without
adequate recognition of resulting transparency issues - and perhaps
without remembering the beneficial aesthetic impact of certain forms
of order maintenance. Some of these conclusions are debatable, I freely acknowledge, and serious investigation is still underway. But
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whether you agree with my assessment of this or that debate is not
particularly important. The core lesson, in my view, is that formulating sound evaluative questions requires understanding different kinds
of appearance-based justifications.
Before going further, a caveat: my normative analysis aims to be
indifferent to particular moral commitments, but it cannot be entirely
agnostic. I do believe that readers with left-wing, right-wing, libertarian, statist, and any number of other ideological loyalties can learn
from the analytical framework that I suggest. A variety of people
should be able to plug their own values into the general framework before reaching conclusions about specific appearance justifications, and
without eliminating insight from the framework. It is "neutral" to this
extent. But the general framework is admittedly less useful to those
with especially restrictive commitments regarding official management
of appearances. For instance, some might flatly oppose intentional
official efforts to influence public perception, at least when the influence is misleading. Such commitments might make many cases seem
easy and an elaborate analytical framework unnecessary, but only via
atypical rigidity of the kind that rules out undercover law enforcement
operations.12 There is, then, moral moderation in what follows. The
Article is less about rattling fundamental commitments, and more
about uncovering the logic of different sorts of appearance justifications in order to facilitate intelligent normative evaluation - so that
we can, in a loose sense of the phrase, start seeing appearance arguments for what they really are.
I.

DISTINGUISHING APPEARANCE FROM REALITY

For an analysis to be worthwhile, the category of appearance-based
justifications must be distinctive. One might begin by contrasting appearance and reality, as people commonly do, but is there a meaningful
difference? Can the difference be specified in accord with typical
usage in legal argument - as in the assertion that "[c]orporate participation in candidate elections creates a substantial risk of corruption or
the appearance thereof"?13 These conceptual questions are addressed
below. Of course the suggestions here will not end any foundational
12 Similarly, people may hold defensible objections to particular processes by which officials
influence perceptions, as Professor Jed Rubenfeld has noted to me. Strong forms of these objections cut across all appearance/reality models. One might think that officials should never implant computer chips in people's heads without their consent, even if solely for the purpose of
transmitting standard time whenever a subject wants to know it. These process-related objections are worth article-length treatment, and they are not the subject of my investigation, but they
can be easily added to my general framework. They are in the nature of specific side constraints.
13 Supplemental Brief for the Appellee at 8, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (201o) (No.
08-205), 2009 WL 22193oo, at *8 (emphasis added).
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philosophical debates. No article, let alone a law review article, can do
that. The more humble goal of this Part is to concisely distinguish appearance from reality in a way that is informed by academic inquiry,
consistent with everyday understandings, and useful for the positive
and normative analysis that follows.
A. Pedestriansand Philosophers
Considerable doubt can be raised about the significance of alleged
differences between appearance and reality. Surely it is difficult to
show that the former is less valuable than the latter. Aesthetic design
choices survived the form-follows-function dictates of high modernism,14 symbols are taken seriously if not violently,15 and digitized virtual realities allow second lives to be lived in socially meaningful
ways. 16 If these instances count as appearances, they must count for
something. One might also think that appearance and reality are
points on the same dimension rather than categorically different concepts. References to appearance and reality often arrive together and
relate to the same subject, as in the appearance and reality of safety or
corruption. Furthermore, many policy debates occur within a fog of
uncertainty and error, whether the topic is health, immigration, crime,
or terrorism. Being "in touch with reality" might not be very common,
and it might not be so vital.
Yet appearance and reality are supposed to be different, and getting the gist of the asserted difference may help illuminate what appearance justifications are all about. Start with ordinary usage. Often
the notion of appearance is linked to perception and belief. People
regularly discuss the way an event appears to their senses, along with
beliefs derived from that perception. Dictionary definitions of "appearance" accordingly refer to an external show or to the outward aspect of something based on sense impression,' 7 which can be processed
into a belief about the world. ("That rusty bridge appears likely to collapse.") The idea of reality is perhaps more difficult to pin down in

14 See Louis H. Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT'S
MAG., Mar. 1896, at 403, 408 ("[F]orm ever follows function, and this is the law."); cf ADOLF
Loos, Ornament and Crime (1929), reprinted in ORNAMENT AND CRIME 167, 169 (Michael
Mitchell trans., 1998) (contending that "in economic respects [ornamentation] is a crime").
15 See Luke Harding, How One of the Biggest Rows of Modern Times Helped Danish Exports
to Prosper, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 30, 2006, at 24; John Lancaster, Pakistani Cleric Announces Bounty for Killing of Danish Cartoonists,WASH. PosT, Feb. 18, 2oo6, at A2 I.
16 See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A Primer, in THE STATE OF
PLAY 13, 13-16 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2oo6) ("[V]irtual worlds are real, as
well." Id. at 15.); cf Yochai Benkler, There Is No Spoon, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra, at 180,
180-81, 186 (stressing social relationships that are enabled by collaborative software platforms).
17 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 88 (3 d ed.
1992); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (ioth ed. 1996).
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pedestrian talk, but such conversation often distinguishes it from appearance, perception, and belief. Definitions of "reality" refer to things
that are not illusory, that occur in fact, or that have an objective existence.s ("In reality, there is a negligible chance that the bridge will
collapse.") People thus tend to use the term "appearance" to signify
superficial impressions, while "reality" means something like the objective truth.1 9
The ability to distinguish appearance from reality is a sign of maturity in more than one way. It marks cognitive progress in children,
most of whom grasp simple appearance/reality distinctions by the time
they leave kindergarten. When shown an object behind a tinted
transparency, for instance, a typical six-year-old can recognize a difference between what color the object "looks like" and what color the object "really and truly is."20 Professional philosophical inquiry also includes appearance/reality distinctions, albeit with more precision and
lasting disagreement. The relevant discourse has matured over many
centuries and across several subdisciplines. For present purposes,
however, it should be enough to briefly note a few fault lines within
metaphysical and epistemological investigations into objectivity.
In metaphysics, several positions are distinguishable. 2 1 Strong objectivists maintain that there is a truth about the existence and properties of some things in the world that is independent of what people believe. Indeed, this objective reality might be inaccessible to anyone
even under ideal conditions for judgment.2 2 Some metaphysically objective things are concededly dependent on the mind, such as the emotions in your head, but strong objectivists can accommodate psychological facts and proceed to argue about other parts of reality, such as
the bridges outside of your head. 23 These sorts of positions leave plen18 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra
note 17, at 1505.
19 Compare, e.g., MAXIMILIAN FOSTER, KEEPING UP APPEARANCES (1914) (telling the tale

of a couple who move to the big city and live beyond their means), with, e.g., The Al Sharpton
Show, SYNDICATION ONE, http://syndicationi.com/al.htm(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (displaying
the "Keepin' It Real" catchphrase for Al Sharpton's radio show).
20 John H. Flavell, The Development of Children's Knowledge About the Appearance-Reality
Distinction, 41 AM. PSYCHOL. 418, 418 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 See generally NICHOLAS BUNNIN & JIYUAN YU, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 483-84 (2004); Brian Leiter, Law and Objectivity, in THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 969 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002); John Wisdom, Appearance and Reality, 52 PHIL. 3 (1977).
22 This position was illustrated in Plato's Republic through the allegory of the cave, see PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. VII, 514a-518e, at 273-79 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Charles Scribner's
Sons 1928) (c. 36o B.C.E.), in which even the sunlit world above could provide only a link to the
Forms.
23 See Leiter, supra note 21, at 970-71 (explaining "constitutional independence" from the
mind (which cannot include psychological facts), "cognitive independence" (which does), and
"causal independence" (which is irrelevant to objectivity)).
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ty of room for beliefs (perhaps based on something called appearance)
that may or may not match objective reality. At another extreme,
strong subjectivists maintain that there is no reality or truth other than
what is believed by the particular mind or minds in question. 2 4 This
position might eliminate any important appearance/reality distinction.
There are also intermediate positions in which what counts as metaphysically objective is partly dependent on the mind. One version uses
the conclusions reached by some community of observers to identify
objective truth, and another uses the conclusion that would be reached
under appropriate or ideal conditions for judgment.25 Here the space
for appearance-based beliefs separate from reality opens up again.
If there is an objective reality of some dimension, epistemological
issues follow. 2 6 The core question is how to conclude that knowledge
about the real world has been achieved. A committed skeptic might
insist that there is a greater than zero probability that you are under
the sway of a computer simulation that is manipulating your every
sense impression, and so you cannot really "know" anything, except
perhaps conceptual truths. 2 7 Few people hold themselves to the highest standards of certainty for knowledge in most situations, however.
One need not extend those stringent tests beyond "[t]he pastime of
epistemology." 28
Most people would understandably conclude, if
pressed, that they know that there was in fact green grass on the
ground last summer. Perhaps as a matter of principle they should hold
residual doubt about this conclusion, but not for any obvious practical
24

For conflicting interpretations of the dictum "Man is the measure of all things," compare

C.M. Gillespie, The Truth of Protagoras, 19 MIND 470, 482-84, 492 (1910), which understands it
as relativist and subjectivist, with F.C.S. SCHILLER, PLATO OR PROTAGORAS? 8-lo, 15-18, 21
(1908), which understands it as pragmatic.
25 See Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence, 72 TEx. L. REV. 187, 192-

94 (1993) (book review).
26 Even if nothing were metaphysically objective, there still would be practically important
questions about how beliefs should be formed or defended.
27 Cf RENi DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641), reprinted in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 45, 62-63 (Donald A.
Cress trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 4 th ed. 1998) (introducing the malicious-demon hypothetical
in which a person's sense impressions are manipulated); HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH
AND HISTORY 5-8, 12-21 (1981) (arguing, however, that the "brain-in-a-vat" supposition has a
self-refuting quality). The strong skeptical position is played out in PETER UNGER, IGNORANCE I (1975), which also suggests limits to the classical form of the argument, see id. at 5-6, I12. Cf IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS 99-100, log-1o
(Lewis W. Beck ed., Liberal Arts Press 1950) (1783) (arguing that people cannot have knowledge
of objects in themselves but that they can have important knowledge of objects as they appear).
28 David Lewis, Elusive Knowledge, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 549, 559 (1996); see also id.
at 562-67 (suggesting that, in securing knowledge, different possibilities are properly ignored in
different contexts); cf Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 87 (1996) (suggesting that truth claims must be partitioned by discourse); Gerald J.
Erion & Barry Smith, Skepticism, Morality, and The Matrix, in THE MATRIX AND PHILOSOPHY 16, 22-25 (William Irwin ed., 2002) (similar).
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purpose. Even using a compromised test for knowledge, though, reasonable disagreement over the best procedures for identifying truth
will persist. Given finite resources and limited cognitive capacity, hard
choices must be made. There also is debate over which statements are
rightly susceptible to testing for truth and falsity in the first place.2 9
But wide agreement on the existence of objective reality and human
knowledge is notable, as is the persistent need for tests of justifiable
belief.
B. Working Definitions
These observations point toward a useful working definition of appearance, as contrasted with reality. Fortunately, evaluating appearance
justifications does not require a choice among all of the available metaphysical and epistemological positions. Definitions can be formulated
that are informed by those positions but that avoid taking sides on the
foundational question of whether there is an objective reality in a
strong sense. I have in mind the following formulation: for a given
proposition about the world, (i) appearance can be defined as a source
for the perception of information that an observer considers relevant to
forming a belief about this proposition - whether or not this source is
good for forming a well-justified belief; and (2) reality can be defined as
either the strongly objective truth about this proposition or the best justified belief about this proposition that any observer holds - whether
or not this truth or best belief corresponds with a given appearance.
On these understandings, a person forms at least some of her beliefs about the world based in part on her perceptions of the world's
appearances, and these appearances need not help people ascertain the
objective truth or the best available belief about the truth. Appearance involves accessible information that might or might not accurately reflect the reality in question, like a potentially imperfect proxy for a
variable of interest. But with these definitions, it does not matter
whether a mind-independent reality exists or can be known with certainty. Reality is defined broadly enough to persist either way and still
provide a convenient contrast to appearance. These unorthodox definitions do mix metaphysical and epistemological concepts. Despite the
resulting impurity, they are operable, close enough to common understandings, and applicable to debates over law.
Consider Baze v. Rees, 30 which upheld a popular lethal injection
protocol. 3 ' Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion concluded that
state officials may paralyze a prisoner during the execution to "pre29 See Leiter, supra note 21, at 975-76 (discussing semantic objectivity).
30 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).

31 See id. at 1525-27 (plurality opinion).
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serv[e] the dignity of the procedure, especially where convulsions or
seizures could be misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress." 3 2
Perhaps this conclusion is troubling because paralysis conceals relevant
information about inmate pain, as Justice Stevens argued.33 But however the normative question is resolved, we can sensibly use the term
"appearance" to refer to the basis for observer perceptions and beliefs
(that is, convulsions) regarding some proposition about the world (that
is, inmate pain), and those beliefs might or might not correspond to the
best-justified or deepest truth of the matter. Whether the reality of
pain is truly objective should not affect our ability to distinguish reality from appearance in this setting. A hyper-subjectivist response that
"there is no such thing as a 'reality of pain"' is unproductive, as is the
assertion that there is no difference between impressions gleaned by
amateurs and the insights of trained experts.
Although the foregoing fits well with propositions about the present
or past, an objective reality about the future seems impossible. There
would be no such reality with which to contrast appearance regarding
an inmate execution that has not occurred. Furthermore, estimated
probabilities about the likelihood of pain might not be objective.3 4
But recall that our inclusive definition of reality reaches some beliefs.
A person can have beliefs about the likelihood of future events even if
those propositions are not metaphysically objective. Moreover, an
amateur's impression of, say, a health risk usually will be less justified
than, say, a physician's estimate. Our working definitions therefore
can be used to analyze efforts at building expectations about the future, as well as shaping perceptions about the present and the past.
II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN APPEARANCE AND REALITY

Appearance can be defined to distinguish reality, but understanding
connections between the two will become a foundation for normative
evaluation later on. There are several potential relationships, at least
if we account for the influence of appearance-sensitive behavior over
time. The possibilities are similar to familiar statistical associations
between two variables - correlated and uncorrelated, positive and
negative, causal and noncausal, linear and nonlinear. Not every possibility is worth vetting here, however. This Part concentrates on three
relationships that are plainly relevant to government decisions: (i) reality insulated from appearance, (2) appearance driving reality over
Id. at 1535.
See id. at 1544 & n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the "aesthetic rationale," id. at 1544 n.3). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on grounds of stare decisis.
See id. at 1552.
34 Alternatively, perhaps "God plays dice" and some aspects of a metaphysically objective reality are irreducibly probabilistic.
32

33
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time,35 and (3) reality collapsing into appearance from the outset. Positive causal associations are most intuitive in the following examples,
but I will take up potentially negative associations at certain points.
The general thought is that relatively accessible appearances sometimes -

but only sometimes -

A. Bridges -

help make for a reality of interest.

Reality Insulatedfrom Appearance

Suppose that residents of two towns separated by a river want a
bridge to connect them. Recognizing that the bridge will be largely
worthless if nobody uses it, and that nobody will use the bridge if it
seems unsafe, officials want a bridge that is unlikely to collapse and
that appears equally safe to the public. So the bridge is built to meet a
chosen level of structural integrity and is decked out to match common
perceptions of sturdiness. The adornments include fresh paint, visible
rivets, and no architectural frills. The bridge would be a disaster waiting to happen if it were ready to collapse while appearing perfectly
safe, but it would be a monumental waste if the bridge were quite safe
without looking that way.
Such appearance-based efforts to influence public opinion are
widespread in the private and public sectors. The business of advertising is built on demand for these techniques, as is architecture.3 6
Professional architects understand that casual observers tend to associate the appearance of certain materials with certain physical properties, regardless of expert risk calculations: opacity is associated with
rigidity, for instance, and transparency is associated with fragility.
Architects have been known to include visible elements, such as struts,
with no effect on the physical integrity of a structure, in the hope of producing a calming effect on untrained observers.37 Governments have
used analogous techniques to improve road safety, sometimes in an attempt to increase public perceptions of danger. Recently, Chicago officials ordered transverse lines painted across a stretch of road that includes a particularly dangerous curve on Lake Shore Drive.38 The lines

3s As the discussion should make clear, appearance on its own does not drive reality,
even under my definitions. Sometimes people rely on (their perception of) an appearance to form beliefs
or attitudes, which then influence decisions to behave in some way. Over time, these behaviors
may influence the pertinent reality, such as the level of corruption or violence. Occasionally I will
describe this process using shorthand formulations that I trust will not obscure the sometimes
complex causal chains involved.
36 See JONATHAN E. SCHROEDER, VISUAL CONSUMPTION 92 (2002) ("Architecture is a
language - a language of metaphor.... That is, built form constitutes a system of representation
and signifying practices. Buildings mean something.").
37 I thank Chris Thompson, a Chicago architect, for these examples.
38 See Jon Hilkevitch, Lake Shore Drive's Curve to Get New Stripes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2006,
§ 2 (Metro), at 3.
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become closer together as they approach the curve, giving many drivers a sense of speed greater than they otherwise would experience.3 9
Many government projects are much like the proverbial bridge,
some of them extremely successful. Think about the production of
economic data such as the unemployment rate and gross domestic
product. These numbers would not be relied on if they were not believed to be reliable. 40 Judicial decisions are analogous. Presiding in
temple-like structures, wearing standardized robes, sitting on elevated
benches, listening to arguments, and publishing explanations for their
major decisions, judges in the United States accumulate such respect
for their work that others are willing to enforce their judgments and
litigants often abide without enforcement efforts. 4 1 Like judges, the
rest of government has an appearance and reality of quality. And, like
the bridge, one might say that a corrupt government that appears virtuous is terrible while a virtuous government that appears corrupt is
useless.
These examples share a notable feature: the possibility that appearances diverge, perhaps radically, from reality. Whether the proposition
is the shakiness of a bridge or the crookedness of a government, that
which is easily perceived might not correspond with the truth. At least
at the time of those perceptions, appearance will not influence the reality of those propositions. Simply believing that a bridge is safe does
not make it safe. An optimist might hope that appearance usually conforms to reality, but in these situations there is no obvious reason to
think that appearance dictates reality through effects on behavior.
There might be nonobvious reasons to believe that appearance will influence reality over time in the above examples - positively or perhaps negatively. 42 But it will help to keep in mind a simplified bridge
model that stands for situations in which reality is insulated from appearance's effect on beliefs and behavior.
3 See id. Other tactics for spreading danger perceptions are less subtle. In rural China, off
Highway 215, a smashed car is suspended fifteen feet above the ground along with the inscription
"Four People Died." PETER HESSLER, COUNTRY DRIVING 121 (2010).

40 That is, reliable after taking into account known controversies over methodological choices,
such as excluding discouraged workers from the "unemployed" when calculating the unemployment rate.
41 Cf Benjamin Woodson et al., Judicial Symbols and the Link Between Institutional Legitimacy and Acquiescence 1, 15-27 (2011) (prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902275 (reviewing
studies and finding that judicial symbols tend to trigger feelings of judicial legitimacy and thus
increase acceptance of unwelcome Supreme Court decisions among nonblack college student respondents with relatively low previous exposure to the Court).
42 Judges might psychologically internalize the norms that they display, see infra pp. 15 78-79
(discussing self-fulfilling prophecies), and people might crowd a safe-looking bridge in a way that
makes the structure less safe during the next time period, see infra note 59 and accompanying text
(discussing self-defeating prophecies).
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Appearance Driving Reality

Now suppose that town residents want credit. One type of desired
financial institution will accept deposits that remain available on demand, while lending most of the take to entrepreneurs willing to pay
interest. As long as some critical mass of depositors does not attempt
to withdraw funds simultaneously, the banks will have an opportunity
to survive and facilitate innovation and economic growth. One of the
tricks, then, is to generate the belief among a sufficient number of potential and actual depositors that the banks will not be destabilized by
depositors making a run. Various techniques are used to achieve this
shared confidence. Bank buildings are designed to match cultural cues
of stability, and an insurance scheme is worked out so that depositors
are covered in the event of a bank run, which in turn makes a run less
likely.
This story is part of the actual history of U.S. banking. 4 3 Banks
became a crucial source of credit, and depositor confidence was addressed by reserve requirements, regulatory oversight, discount windows, insurance, and even architecture. The First Bank of the United
States building in Philadelphia had a marble facade and European
styling reminiscent of the Bank of England;44 the Second Bank building, like many government buildings of that era, was fashioned after
Greek temples. 45 Pivoting away from the Great Depression, many new
banks shifted to a fortress model with an emphasis on steel and granite. 4 6 The First National Bank of Chicago evoked "qualities of
strength, security, and prodigious assets" partly by the display of granite cladding, "which was structurally unnecessary and added significantly to the expense." 47 Such design choices signal private information about financial stability or otherwise tap perceptions of reliability.
Architecture is hardly the only way to generate confidence, especially
in an age of online transactions. Ultimately banks became more heavily scrutinized by regulators for financial soundness, and governmentrun deposit insurance for many banks was implemented via the Banking Act of 1933.48 Banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
43 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2-32 (4 th ed. 2oo9); BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING 138-238, 241, 243-44 (1990).
44 See Susan Wagg, A Critical Look at Bank Architecture, in MONEY MATTERS 15, 23-24,

250, 254 (Joel Stein & Caroline Levine eds., 19go).
45 See id. at 26-28, 250; see also Robert Nisbet, Men and Money: Reflections by a Sociologist,
in MONEY MATTERS, supra note 44, at 7, 8 (describing banks and churches as relying on the
faith and confidence of users).
46 See Wagg, supra note 44, at 228-30, 235-36, 251-52.
47 Id. at 252.

48 Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see
2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 166 (2002).
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Corporation (FDIC) are now required to display the assurance of protection in their branch locations and in certain advertising.4 9 Deposit
insurance and regulatory oversight seem to soothe many people who
choose banks with these features, and such measures likely help
achieve greater bank longevity in the United States.5 0
The bank-run problem and its confidence-based solution represent
two forms of self-fulfilling prophecy - a concept now familiar in several intellectual disciplines. The label refers to situations in which a
belief is the basis for behavior that pushes reality toward that belief
over time. 5 If many bank depositors believe that there is or will be a
run on the bank, they will help cause the run as they scramble to save
their savings; if they believe otherwise, a run is less likely. Sociologist
Robert K. Merton invented the phrase and extended the idea from
bank runs to race relations in 1948.52 African Americans were viewed
as undisciplined strikebreakers by union members in the wake of World
War I, Merton asserted, partly because the former group was left with
little alternative after having been excluded from unions based on that
same view. 5 3 "[M]en respond not only to the objective features of a situation," he claimed, "but also, and at times primarily, to the meaning
this situation has for them. And once they have assigned some meaning
to the situation, their consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning." 54
The idea is also cognizable in the game theoretic terms of economists.
A bank run and bank stability represent multiple equilibria that depend
on each participant's expectations about other participants' behavior.55

49 See 12

C.F.R. §H

328.o-4 (2011).

50 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 43, at 47, 309-10.
5 See generally Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, in A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 681-82 (Andrew M. Colman ed., 2009); see also Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, Stigma, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, ONLINE EDITION (Steven N. Durlauf &
Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); L. Jussim, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 13,830, 13,830-31 (2001) (requiring false beliefs);
James M. Olson et al., Expectancies, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 211, 222 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie
W. Kruglanski eds., 1996) ("[T]he perceiver's expectancy serves to elicit behavior from the target
that confirms the expectancy and that might not have occurred otherwise."). There are much
looser uses of the term on which I will not rely. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin,
Constitutional Dictatorship:Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 18og, 1843-48
(2oo) (involving assertions of crisis that help cause emergency power authorizations, but apparently not the existence of the asserted crisis).
52 See Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. 193, 193-95 (1948).
53 See id. at 196-97.
54 Id. at 194; accord WILLIAM I. THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS, THE CHILD IN
AMERICA 572 (1928) ("If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.").
55 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 403 (1983).
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Under certain conditions, shared expectations become the basis for
common strategies.56
The notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy is expandable in other ways,
too. Merton concentrated on false beliefs and "the perversities of social logic,"5 yet a similar dynamic applies to beneficial consequences
and to beliefs that are not falsifiable at the outset. Widespread depositor confidence in a bank can make the institution justifiably stable,
whether or not the expectation against a future bank run can be
counted as a false belief. Nor is it necessary that anyone intend to
produce the appearance or its consequences; shared beliefs that underwrite reality over time may come about more spontaneously. Furthermore, the key behavioral effects might occur in several places: in
those who perceive the appearance, in those who are the subject of
perception, or both.58
In addition, prophecies can be self-defeating instead of selffulfilling. A bank run is the classic illustration of the latter, while anticipated crowding illustrates the former.5 9 If everyone believes that
many people will show up at a particular location at a particular time,
it could be that no such crowd materializes. Enough people might
avoid the (mis)predicted crowd by not showing up. This outcome depends on touchy variables, of course, including how one person anticipates another person's response to pessimistic conventional wisdom
about the future. In any event, expectations can have quite different
influences on reality over time depending on the details of the social
environment.
Two seemingly analogous dynamics should be distinguished, however. First, positive-feedback loops overlap with, but are not the same
as, self-fulfilling prophecies. These loops encourage path dependence
insofar as alternatives become progressively less attractive over time,
but they are not necessary to a self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance,
bank stability can be a fragile equilibrium in a skittish social environ56 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 39 (1994) (discussing
unpredictable outcomes and focal strategies); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, ioo J. POL. ECON. 992, 1013 &
n.28 (1992) (asserting that bank runs can result from socially costly yet fragile information cascades). The bank confidence situation presents a recursive expectations issue. One person must
believe that some number of other persons will not withdraw, which depends on what other persons believe about everyone else's behavior (and so on). Achieving shared confidence might seem
logically complex, but it happens.
57 Merton, supra note 52, at 195; see id. at 195-96, 208-l0. Merton was more successful at
illustrating virulent in-group/out-group dynamics, see id. at 197-208, than he was at explaining
from where the impetus for "deliberate institutional controls" would come, id. at 210 (emphasis
omitted).
58 See Olson et al., supra note si, at 222.
59 See Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, in DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 434 (Craig
Calhoun ed., 2002).
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ment, and path dependence can occur without the complications of
appearance/reality gaps. Also distinct is deterrence through expectation of punishment, along with encouragement through expectation of
reward. Incentives do operate through expectations that may be based
on appearances, but this chain of causation need not take the form of a
self-fulfilling prophecy. People's belief that the risk of detection is fifty
percent will not always lead to conduct making it more likely that the
risk of detection actually is fifty percent; and certainly the risk of detection can be fifty percent even if people do not believe it. Whatever
role appearances play in criminal justice, there is no necessary link between the identified beliefs and the corresponding facts. 60
C. Clocks -

Reality Collapsing into Appearance

Now suppose that town residents, having become more interconnected, wish to coordinate their activities temporally. They need a social convention for keeping time, which need not track any cosmic reality about the progress of time. So town authorities have an ornate
clock tower built in the center of town, a structure that is considered
beautiful enough to attract public attention and that represents the
time of day by reference to a local sundial. It becomes the time
benchmark for town residents. Later, townspeople more frequently interact with nonresidents as transportation and communication technologies improve. These interactions generate demand for the coordination of time conventions across more and more jurisdictions, leading to
regional standard times and standardized differences between regions.
The foregoing is, once again, a condensed portrayal of two centuries of human effort. Railroads, astronomers, diplomats, and others
worked to spread stable conventions regarding time, and their efforts
were remarkably successful. 6' Asking Google, "What time is it?" yields
a link to a government website that displays "Official U.S. Time"
based on a set of atomic clocks here and abroad. 6 2 This official time is
the reference point for countless information systems, including com60 Again, less straightforward causal links might exist. Widespread belief that law enforcement will quickly apprehend wrongdoers should deter many rational actors from wrongdoing,
making it easier for law enforcement to quickly apprehend the remaining contingent of wrongdoers - assuming that this effect is not washed out by potential victims' unexpectedly letting
down their guard.
61 See IAN R. BARTKY, SELLING THE TRUE TIME I-3, 205 (2000) (emphasizing the role of
astronomers); Eviatar Zerubavel, The Standardizationof Time: A SociohistoricalPerspective, 88
AM. J. Soc. 1, 6-8 (1982) (emphasizing the role of railroads); see also Ian R. Bartky & Elizabeth
Harrison, Standard and Daylight-Saving Time, Sci. AM., May 1979, at 46 (noting, however, both
resistance to daylight savings time and certain pressures to redraw time zones).
62 See Demetrios Matsakis, Timekeeping at the US Naval Observatory, IEEE AESS SYS.
MAG., June 2003, at 9, 9-12; USNO Master Clock, U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY,
http://www.usno.navy.mil/USNO/time/master-clock (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
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puter network timekeepers and the Global Positioning System. Standard time is only one of many solutions to coordination problems that
depend on salient benchmarks - several of which were authorized by
the embarrassingly underappreciated Weights and Measures Clause of
the Constitution.63
Clock towers and similar phenomena are reminders that appearance and reality may, roughly speaking, collapse. In the case of standard time used for coordination purposes, the reality in question is
constructed from beliefs that follow salient representations of time.
There is no deeper truth to be discovered. The widespread belief that
it is now i2:o PM basically is the reality of the matter. To complain,
as some early critics did, 6 4 that standard time does not accurately reflect God's version of time is to sidestep the basic point. Standard
time does not purport to be anything other than a useful human convention. Of course, standard time is not a matter of individualized
subjective belief. It is a reality about which a broken (or rigged) clock
can give false appearances and about which people can be mistaken.
But the relevant reality is nonetheless constituted by shared beliefs
resting on shared perceptions that are connected to salient appearances.
The idea of appearance/reality collapse has even more force as applied to the subjective elements of aesthetics and expression, which
can be evaluated without reference to any related reality. The relevant
reality is nothing more than the appearance that attracts attention.
Thus, a clock tower's form or a person's garb can be assessed for
beauty without suggesting that there is any truth of the matter beyond
individual subjective valuation. Further, objects and conduct may be
taken as conveying a painful message of insult or an uplifting message
of validation. A Confederate battle flag or a civil rights statute, whatever its other functions, can be viewed as a symbol of respect or disrespect. 65 Each of these phenomena - architecture, fashion, icons,
laws - may be evaluated for aesthetic or expressive quality without
invoking another reality.66 Making those taste-like evaluations can be
63 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 5.
64 See MICHAEL O'MALLEY, KEEPING WATCH: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN TIME 6-io

(1990).
65 See Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 144-56 (observing that symbols not only can have emotional impact, but also may serve a signaling-sorting function).
66 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1511-14 (2000) (defining an expressive moral theory in
terms of constraints on public meaning); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. I, 2 (2000) ("[S]tate action violates Equal Protection if its meaning
conflicts with the government's obligation to treat each person with equal concern."); Richard H.
Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 5o6-16 (1993). For
criticism, see, for example, Simon Blackburn, Group Minds and Expressive Harm, 6o MD. L.
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controversial, to be sure, just as people sometimes attempt to impress
one correct interpretation on certain texts. Even so, people can and do
assess the aesthetic, insulting, threatening, and validating qualities of
the world for themselves and on those measures alone.
III. EVALUATING APPEARANCE JUSTIFICATIONS

Although not exhaustive, the discussion above offered three models
for the relationship between appearance and reality as I define those
terms. For the clock, appearance and reality are essentially the same
from the start. For the bridge, appearance does not influence the reality to which it corresponds and the two might be dangerously different
at any time. For the bank, an appearance of stability helps push the
institution toward that reality over time. Granted, a given decisionmaker may have little control over appearance, or how diverse cohorts
of observers react thereto, and the applicable model will not always be
clear to anyone. Sometimes more than one model will be in play. But
with distinct models in mind, we can better understand and assess appearance justifications. These justifications will likely prompt a different set of normative questions depending on the posited relationship
between appearance and reality. Without intelligent questions, observers will not get intelligent answers.
These questions, by the way, do not seem hitched to any conventional metric of political ideology. Appearance justifications are both
embraced and rejected by leftists, rightists, libertarians, statists, and
others. Obviously, people sharing one of these ideologies will support
appearance justifications under distinct conditions. But none of the
familiar ideological groupings indicate systematically greater acceptance of appearance justifications. In Supreme Court decisions, for
example, the evaluation of appearance arguments is sometimes unanimous. All participating Justices condemned a town's attempt to
dampen white panic selling by enacting a ban on "For Sale" and
"Sold" signs for houses,6 7 while there seems to be an equally wide consensus that judges should appear impartial in the hope of boosting
public confidence. 68 Furthermore, so-called conservative and so-called
REV. 467, 488-91 (2001), which questions whether a concept of expressive harm is necessary to
explain or justify law's functions, and Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000), which attempts to clarify expressive theories of law and
doubts that law's meaning has "foundational moral relevance," id. at 1375 (emphasis omitted).
For distinct usage of the term, see Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000), which discusses solutions to coordination problems.
67 See Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 87-88, 95-98 & nn.9-io (1977) (distinguishing efforts to reduce misleading information, to publicize the number of white residents, and
to subsidize residential stability).
68 For a controversial application of this common position, see Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988), which listed public confidence among the factors for
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liberal judges each use appearance justifications to reach different
conclusions. The former faction invoked appearances to support the
lethal injection protocol in Baze v. Rees, 69 and the latter faction invoked appearances to support limits on contributions to political parties in McConnell v. FEC. 0
The cynical view is that appearance justifications are rhetorical
gambits without serious influence on decisions, akin to many claims
about federalism, judicial restraint, due process, and other values with
fair-weather fan bases. But even if appearance arguments are often
tactical, they have logical substance. Conscientious decisionmakers
should grapple with them. And the inquiry is complicated because
there is no uniform answer for all occasions. Nobody in her right
mind should accept or reject appearance justifications in all situations.
How, then, should we react to appearance justifications? This Part
suggests general normative considerations with widespread appeal,
understanding that they should be processed with attention to individual observer values and particular circumstances. Boiled down, these
general lessons are: (i) regardless of model, issues of cost, need, efficacy,
and institutional competence arise when officials justify decisions
based on hoped-for appearances; (2) under a clock model, the assessment of an appearance justification will sometimes be deeply contested
but often relatively straightforward for each observer; (3) under a
bridge model, transparency issues will likely emerge insofar as the appearance of government operations might be different from the reality;
(4) under a bank model, however, transparency issues will fade as attention shifts to causation issues surrounding self-fulfilling prophecies.
Together, these considerations form a framework for evaluating an array of appearance arguments. Because cost, need, efficacy, and institutional competence are omnipresent issues, I will not point out their relevance at every juncture. And because clock models are simplest and
often applicable, I begin with them.

vacating a judgment based on the appearance of bias and affirmed vacatur even though the judge
was unaware of his conflict of interest during trial.
69 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1535 (2oo8) (plurality opinion); see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election
Bd., 128 S. Ct. 16io, 1620, 1623 (20o8) (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("[Plublic confidence in the integrity
of the electoral process . . . encourages citizen participation in the democratic process." Id. at
1620.); id. at 1624-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
697 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The unintelligibility of this Court's precedent raises the further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges
turns on judicial predilections.").
70 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (200);

see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-69 (1992) (retaining a modified
abortion right and sourcing the Court's legitimacy partly in public perception of legally principled
decisions and stare decisis).

HeinOnline -- 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1583 2011-2012

1584

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

IVol. 125:1563

A. Appearance/Reality Collapse
Begin with social constructions, such as standard time, social status, physical beauty, or race (in one sense"). They can be used for
virtuous or dastardly ends, easing the organization of either deserving
liberation movements or destructive subordination campaigns, and
there can be disagreement over which is which. The same can be said
for attempts to establish favored norms by creating a shared social
meaning for certain conduct. 7 2 In other respects, however, the evaluative task is straightforward. There is no need to worry about a successful construction's failure to match reality. If everyone understands
that the construction is meant to be its own mind-dependent reality,
questions about deception are inapposite.73 Coordinated minds are
themselves constitutive of the relevant reality. The issue, then, is
whether the project of building the social construction is good or bad
in other ways.
Similar thoughts govern aesthetics and expressive impact. Yes, observers might perceive an appearance differently, disagree over whether and how it should be assigned meaning, or value the same meaning
differently. Some view California's Proposition 8 as a stigmatizing devaluation of gay relationships; others see the law as democratic confirmation of a traditional requirement of marriage. 4 And whether or
not there is good reason to disagree about the content of the message,
people might still differ over the law's merit. Other challenging issues
are, nevertheless, sidelined. Observers looking for meaning and making aesthetic judgments need not confront additional complications associated with appearance/reality gaps. A cap or a city or a constitution
can be thought ugly or pretty without any reference to any (other) reality with which it might not correspond. Likewise, a speech or a sign
or a statute can be insulting or validating, regardless of whether the
audience is missing "the" socially correct meaning and regardless of
whether the message influences behavior. People can and do evaluate
for themselves the aesthetics and messages of various decisions. If we
ignore these individualized reactions, we ignore real-world experiences.

71 See PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM 9 (1967) (noting a socially assigned
version of "race").
72 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 350-51 (1997) (indicating that law expresses shared valuations that might influence the behavior of those who perceive those messages); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 954-55, 957-58 (1995) (recognizing that actions may retain a distribution of
meanings across observers and that government may be inept at influencing social meaning).
73 To reiterate, I refer here to successful social conventions, not broken or rigged clocks.
74 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932-38 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (relating testimony of Proposition 8 opponents and proponents).
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So the clock model does not guarantee consensus, and the opportunities for disagreement are reflected in legal disputes. Thus the propriety of paralyzing inmates during their executions was strongly
contested, and judges usually will not seriously entertain constitutional
challenges to government-hoisted Confederate battle flags 5 even as
litigation over government-appropriated religious symbols is commonplace.7 6 Nevertheless, clock model debates are streamlined in important respects. They rely on logic and values special to aesthetics and
expressivism. These debates do share issues with other models: conscientious evaluators should question whether an appearancemanagement attempt is needed, how effective it can be, the cost of trying, and the appropriate mix of public and private decisionmakers.
Plus a value set is required. But the other models prompt additional
questions.
B. Appearance/Reality Separation
If appearance might not match a related reality, new sets of normative questions tend to arise. In the bridge model, the possibility of
slippage raises transparency questions about information insiders' manipulating appearances to their advantage. In the bank model, by
contrast, the prospect of appearance's facilitating the emergence of a
corresponding reality raises causal questions about the true force of
appearance. The bridge model is not entirely separate from the bank
model, it should be noted: the latter represents a subset of all behavioral effects caused by appearances, albeit an especially curious and
useful subset when transparency is prized. Crudely speaking, however, bridge situations present special issues of transparency while bank
situations present special issues of causation.
i. Bridge Models and Transparency. - If an appearance cannot
influence its corresponding reality, even over time, most people will
have trepidation about appearance-management efforts. An unsafe
bridge designed so that the untrained eye sees safety puts typical bridge
users at risk without the ability to accept, reject, or change that risk
based on either the objective truth or the best available belief. In this
respect, they would be driving blind. Depending on additional details,
the situation implicates misrepresentation, negligent failure to warn, or
other problematic conduct on the part of those responsible for the strucO

1555, 1566 (iith Cir. 19go) (stating that Alabama's Confederate flag display, although offensive to many, is a "political matter which is not within [the
court's] province to decide").
76 For now. Cf. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 18I9--20 (2010) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (applying, but injecting criticisms of, the endorsement test for government use of religious symbols);
id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (assuming that "the socalled 'endorsement test"' should apply).
75 See, e.g., NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d
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ture. As such misconduct spreads, society becomes more hierarchical
and dysfunctional. At the extreme, citizens are mired in an Oceaniastyle dystopia in which information is fabricated by the powerful to
exploit the powerless." This kind of threat is the downside of institutions' learning how to enhance perceptions of fairness and levels of sociological legitimacy without otherwise reforming their operations. 8
Today's catchphrase for the problem is "lack of transparency." Although the label is shallow, 9 the notion of transparency is grounded in
understandable concerns - concerns about agents failing to serve the
interests of their principals, and about strangers depriving others of
the power to make informed decisions that affect the well-being of
themselves and their political communities. These issues are old.8 0
The essential point here is that, while transparency worries are less serious for the clock and bank models, they nag the bridge model. The
most anxious libertarian might fear that government secrecy is a constantly expanding problem, as Max Weber's bureaucratic "professional
insider" seeks to hoard advantages over outsiders through secrecy.81
But even tepid democrats start to become concerned when officials
may control how their operations appear without similarly influencing
their actual conduct.
To be sure, the appropriate extent of government transparency is
fairly disputed. 8 2 Although a bit spooky, official secrecy is, at times, an
excellent idea. Indeed, when people disapprove of information access
restrictions they decry "secrecy," and when they approve they extol
"privacy." Even artifice plays a tragically needed role in an imperfect
world.8 3 Along with self-preservation in the face of unjustified per7 See ORWELL, supra note I, at 36-37.
78 See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, i ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SC. 17, 189-93 (2005).
79 See Adam M. Samaha, Judicial Transparency in an Age of Prediction, 53 VILL. L. REV.
829, 829-30 (2oo8) (explaining that complex institutions cannot be either fully known by any one
person or fully unknown to all persons); see also Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91

892-95 (2oo6).
80 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT

IOWA L. REV. 885,

95-101 (1996) (discussing the heritage of the publicity principle as a presumption to promote democratic accountability); FRANCIS E. ROURKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY 4-5, 39-4o (1961)
(presenting government secrecy as a threat to public observation and control); Adam M. Samaha,
Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 909, 916-22 (2006) (analyzing the issue partly as a principallagent problem).

81 2 MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956, 992 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
82 See Meir Dan-Cohen, DecisionRules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 665-77 (1984); Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy,
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 583 (1986) ("[S]ociety is distinctly ambivalent about the benefits of increased knowledge.').
83 See SISSELA BOK, LYING 34-39 (979) (reviewing commonly accepted positions that justify
certain lies, excuse them, or define away the objection to lying). For the extreme position, see
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sonal threats to life, plausible examples include covert military operations against wartime enemies and undercover operations against domestic criminal organizations. Much already has been written on the
topic and you will have your own opinions. Perhaps the safest synopsis is that deception is usually immoral or unethical and is sometimes
unlawful, but that there are exceptions. More important for present
purposes is the association of transparency concerns with bridge models of the appearance/reality relationship.
(a) Combinations and First-Cut Proposals. - The safe-lookingbridge hypothetical illustrates a serious transparency problem, but it
shows only one appearance/reality combination. Table I isolates four
combinations by supposing that both appearance and reality can be
either good or bad, according to a given normative perspective. This
scheme simplifies matters by ignoring gradations between good and
bad, along with the possibility that uncertainty surrounds the characterization of reality or appearance. Nevertheless, these four combinations allow for some useful normative discussion - beginning with
how these cells might be ranked, then moving on to techniques for navigating among the cells under the bridge model and, in the next subsection, the bank model.
Most comforting is a good appearance paired with a good reality
(cell I), as when a bridge looks and is reasonably safe. The least comforting probably is a good appearance joined with a bad reality (cell 4).
A sturdy-looking yet rickety bridge is a condemnable situation for
mainstream evaluators, in that uninformed observers are made to live
with problems that they cannot perceive, much less combat. This is
true even if extraordinary situations call for a false sense of security,
and even if appearance/reality gaps are sometimes self-correcting. But
the combinations are otherwise difficult to rank without entering longstanding moral and ethical disputes. A bad appearance plus a bad reality (cell 3) has the virtue of providing observers an accurate basis on
which to demand reform, but bad/bad leaves nothing pleasant to experience and the reality might be impossible to change.8 4 In contrast, a
bad appearance joined with a good reality (cell 2) is pleasant for anyone with access to the truth and it too might be self-correcting. A
downside is that observers might demand "corrective action" that is
actually wasteful or dangerous. Public reaction to the perceived risks
IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 346 (Lewis White
Beck trans., 1949).
84 This infeasible change is part of the case for hallucinogens and experience machines. Al-

though drug-induced experiences are "real" on their own terms, I refer, as usual, to situations in
which appearance and reality are related to the same proposition of interest (that is, hallucinations designed to take the place of a "real life" without them).
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of terrorism in the 2ooos and Communism in the 1950s might be examples. 5 Fear is itself a kind of injury, and it will influence behavior
whether or not well founded. 6
TABLE I: COMBINATIONS, MODELS,
AND PROVISIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Good
Reality

Good Appearance

Bad Appearance

( I)

(2)

Bridge:

maintain both appearance
and reality

Bridge:

improve appearance and
maintain reality

Bank:

maintain appearance

Bank:

unfortunately unstable;
improve appearance

Clock:

same as Bank

Clock:

n/a

Bridge:

improve reality and
maintain appearance

Bridge:

improve both appearance
and reality

Bank:

fortunately unstable;
maintain appearance

Bank:

improve appearance

Clock:

n/a

Clock:

same as Bank

(4)

Bad
Reality

(3)

We can leave further ranking efforts to professional philosophers
specializing in experience-machine hypotheticals and the virtues of
painful truths. Our street-level focus is on mainstream policy responses, especially techniques for getting to cell I. As such, the four
cells arrive with first-cut policy recommendations under the bridge
model, subject to case-specific cost and efficacy considerations.
(I) Good appearance/good reality is worth preserving or working toward. The issue is how. On a simple bridge model, appearance and
reality must be maintained separately. The former cannot be used to
influence the latter. (2) Bad appearance/goodreality ordinarily calls for
improvement in the former alone."' An unsafe-looking bridge will not
85 See William J. Burns & Paul Slovic, The Diffusion of Fear:Modeling Community Response
to a Terrorist Strike, 4 J. DEF. MODELING & SIM. 298, 298-301, 305-07 (2007).
86 Institutional responses to such misconceived demands might be best, if the reality cannot be
credibly communicated. For indications that federal prosecution of suspected subversives during
World War I was partly an effort to moderate populist demand for persecution, see PAUL L.
MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

125-26,

165 (1979), which notes that federal officials denounced mob violence while attempting to
harness patriotic fervor to build the war effort.
87 Similar logic applies to situations in which appearances are worse than reality, regardless of
whether appearance or reality should be characterized as "bad." I use the good/bad dichotomy
for clarity in exposition, understanding that the analysis could be complicated by introducing
gradations.
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necessarily make the fact of the matter worse but it can have other
negative effects, hedonic or behavioral. Sometimes advertising the
good news will be sufficient but, often enough, more than cheap talk
will be needed. Insiders might engage in signaling 8 or otherwise conform to the picture of safety held by outsiders, without hope that reality will improve as a result. Indeed, if appearance cannot feasibly be
improved, degrading reality might be preferable to transparency problems. (3) Bad appearance/badreality situations are different. Making
the bridge appear safer will not make it safer, so the real risk of bridge
collapse should be reduced. We might defend appearance manipulation to make the risk appear even worse and thus create pressure for
improvements, but of course this tactic is morally controversial.
Equally controversial is improving appearance without improving reality. Reality might be too difficult to move and appearance too awful
to tolerate; but this "blue pill"** situation is, hopefully, a rare dilemma.
(4) Good appearance/badreality also prompts a noncontroversial firstcut recommendation: ordinarily, improve reality. There are other possibilities that depend on the details; bridge users might be warned of
risk at the same time that the bridge's structural integrity is modestly
improved. But a pleasant appearance, whatever its benefits, will not
change the bridge's structural integrity.
Finally, what about the complicating case of uncertainty? Thorough consideration can leave the most capable observer with doubts
about the relevant facts, not to mention the appropriate value set or
the correct application thereof to a specific issue. Whether or not uncertainty and other forms of indeterminacy are part of objective reality, they are part of the human experience and they can constitute the
best-justified belief. When uncertainty is the "reality," what should be
the appearance? 90 Intuitions might loosen here. But as an opening
presumption, when reality is uncertain, appearance probably should
display uncertainty as well. If the risk of a bridge collapse cannot rationally be pinned down between o.oi% and 1o%, perhaps no one
should be given the impression that the risk is any clearer. This recommendation fits the usual desire to align appearance with reality in
order to energize informed popular judgment. Moreover, intellectuals
lack a consensus prescription for dealing with fundamental doubt.
There is a list of academic decision protocols for conditions of uncer-

88 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000) (discussing costly conduct,
or "signaling," that may help separate good from bad types). A signal is an appearance as I define
the term.
89 See THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. Pictures 1999).
90 I assume that appearance cannot be uncertain with respect to any given observer, although
there can be disagreement across observers regarding how something appears.
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tainty as opposed to mere risk,9 ' including maximin, maximax, and
randomization. 9 2 Given the controversy, perhaps the protocol choice
should be decentralized to the individual level when possible. Even if
uncommon today, officials can alert others to uncertainty through explicit messages of doubt. They can confess uncertainty within bounds
about the actual level of, say, quid pro quo political corruption as well
as they can allege that it happens occasionally, or rarely, or never.
Again, exceptions may be justified. Uncertainty might be difficult
for nonexperts to understand even if easy for experts to express.
Moreover, beneficial action might be possible only if most people are
under the impression that uncertainty has been eliminated. A morally
acceptable course for experts conceivably could be to convince the rest
of us that the residual uncertainty is nonexistent, if such convincing is
necessary to carry out the socially best course of action. One account
of the global climate change debate has this complexion, which is not
far from the Supreme Court's rationale for allowing voter identification demands at polling places.93 Following this route is itself fraught
with risk, of course. The authoritarian dangers are familiar while the
likely gains are unclear, almost by definition. Still, the justifications
can be analyzed along the lines of deception tactics applicable to the
good appearance/bad reality combination. A similar remark applies to
efforts at manufacturing uncertainty when the reality is known to be

good or bad. 9 4
(b) Necessity and Efficacy. - There is more to consider, of course,
even apart from the cost of successfully engineering appearance or reality. Here I want to note two other factors with widespread relevance.
First, attention to appearance is sometimes unnecessary, even under
the bridge model. Appearance/reality gaps can be unstable without
anyone's trying to close them, as with large-scale conspiracies in which
secrecy is difficult to maintain. Strong optimism faces challenges after
such episodes as Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme and the Johnson
91 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20, 231-34 (1921).

92 See, e.g., SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY 32-60 (1986); David Kelsey & John Quiggin, Theories of Choice Under Ignorance and Uncertainty, 6 J. ECON. SURVS. 133, 133-42 (1992);
Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. I, 18-2 1 (2009).
93 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. x61o, 1619-20, 1623 (2008) (opinion
of Stevens, J.); id. at 1624, 1627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the state interests discussed in
the lead opinion, but rejecting the challenge on broader grounds). The Court upheld Indiana's
identification requirement against a facial challenge based on the interests in preventing an unknown level of fraud, as well as reducing the appearance of fraud to maintain voter confidence.
Id. at 1624 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
94 For indications that uncertainty maintenance is an accepted tactic in law enforcement, consider the confidential protocols for selecting subway stops for bag searches in New York City, see
MacWade v. Kelly, 46o F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006), and federal income tax returns for audit, see
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL

H 4-.19.I.I.5.I.8-.Io

(2007), available at http://www.irs.gov

/irm/part4/irm_o4-o9-or i.html.
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Administration's lasting spin on the Vietnam War, but even modest
pessimists will admit that reality often has a gravitational pull on appearance. Conspirators may have incentives to break ranks, and covert behavior may be uncovered through carelessness or alert monitors. At least episodically, "life in a world of myth must collide with
fact in the world of reality."95 The old, superficial markers of underlying truths may come to lose their impact on belief.
Second, even when it seems necessary or worthwhile, manipulating
appearances can be difficult. Some people pay no attention to image
advertising, which can do only so much to control the beliefs of product users.9 6 They have better information than sellers' talk. And different people perceive and interpret events differently, sometimes unpredictably.
The causes of such disparate impressions include
differential access to information, differential resources for processing
information, and differential sensitivity to influences such as cognitive
bias, 97 emotional state, 98 cultural identity,99 and normative bias.100
Thus appearance regulation might not have much effect, or it might
not have the intended effect on the key audience. Indeed, appearance
management efforts can backfire. Denying that you beat your spouse
draws attention to a possibility that listeners might not have entertained.
Take voter fraud. One theory is that a person's perception of widespread fraud is demoralizing, making her less likely to vote, and that
requiring photo identification at polling places will moderate this perception. The Supreme Court relied on this logic in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board.10 1 But there are competing theories - after
all, it is not as if we have a consensus theory of why people vote in the
first place. Perhaps perceptions of fraud prompt outraged citizens to
vote in greater numbers. Perhaps demoralized voters will simply ignore a statutory response. Or perhaps the response will vary with ideology. Voter identification requirements like Indiana's - which was
debated along partisan lines10 2 - could prompt some people to believe that the system is getting better, others to believe the opposite,
95 Merton, supra note 52, at 204.
96 See, e.g., GEORGE A. FLANAGAN, MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ADVERTISING

(1967).
97 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26

J. RISK

63-69

& UNCERTAINTY

121, 121-22 (2003).

98 See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES 397, 397, 420
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
99 See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 72-73, 194-95

(1982); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 149, 149-50 (20o6).
100 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, i9
(2oo6).
101
102

128 S. Ct. 16io, 1620 (2oo8) (opinion of Stevens,
Id. at 1623-24.

HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1111-12, 1118-19

J.).
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and still others to perceive a risk that they had not thought about until
the legislation. Voter identification could be akin to airport security
efforts that some call necessary inconveniences and others call "security theater."103
Existing empirical research also leaves doubt. Studying crosssectional polling data and voting records, Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily found no correlation between beliefs
about voter fraud prevalence and turnout, or between the strength of
voter identification requirements and beliefs about voter fraud.10 4 The
devastating suggestion is that neither causal element of the appearance
justification is demonstrable. But the study raises questions, too. Perhaps antifraud efforts are more likely in places with concerns about
voter fraud, and these measures do reduce those concerns - but only
enough to wash out differences between high and low regulation jurisdictions. The study cannot rule out this possibility, which is better
tested with time-series data. 05 All of this recommends a cautious interest in, not total disregard for, appearance-management efforts.
2. Bank Models and Causation. - Although questions of cost,
need, and efficacy are inescapable, the possibility of appearance positively influencing reality changes the picture. The normatively plausible options suddenly shift if a self-fulfilling prophecy is at work.
First of all, appearance manipulation can now move us from the
lower right quadrant (cell 3) to the upper left (cell I). Society could
elevate out of the bad appearance/bad reality combination by engineering a better appearance. Similarly, society might retain the good
appearance/good reality combination by sustaining the appearance
alone. For example, unstable banks might become and remain stable
through confidence-building measures such as deposit insurance. This
recommendation assumes that propping up the bank is a good goal, of
course, but the present observation is about techniques. Conversely,
attempting to change the underlying reality alone will be ineffective.
Unlike a simple bridge model in which reality and appearance must be
maintained separately, a bank model shifts attention to appearance by
itself.
In addition, the upper right quadrant (cell 2) and the lower left quadrant (cell 4) become unstable, and for reasons different from those that
103 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Things He Carried, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2008, at loo, oo;
see also Thomas E. Baldwin et al., Understanding Public Confidence in Government to Prevent
Terrorist Attacks, 5

J. HOMELAND

SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT., iss. I, 2oo8, art. 4, at 16 (iden-

tifying response patterns among a small group of subjects who watched mock news broadcasts
regarding terrorist attacks).
104 See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The
Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1750-60 (2008).

105 Cf id. at 1755 n.43 (recognizing that fraud perceptions may drive fraud regulation).
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produce instability under the bridge model. Especially potent appearances will eliminate those combinations as self-fulfilling prophecies
pull reality into alignment. Well-functioning banks cannot always
survive rumors of insolvency or a widespread financial panic, while
poorly functioning banks can survive awhile if access to such facts is
restricted. Under the bank model, therefore, a good appearance/
bad reality situation (cell 4) becomes less urgent compared to a bad
appearance/good reality situation (cell 2); the former is self-correcting
while the latter threatens a downward spiral. Something like the opposite is true under the bridge model, to the extent that reality has any
positive causal effect on appearance. For a similar reason, the bank
model makes uncertain realities less significant. If a self-fulfilling
prophecy is in place, we may rely on appearance as a proxy for unobservable reality.
(a) New Causation Questions. - But these differences depend on
the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy - a potentially challenging
causation question. Sometimes the suggestion will seem ridiculous, at
least to intellectuals. The Secret is a self-help outfit that promotes positive visualization techniques. Among them is daily concentration on
statements such as, "I am receiving unexpected checks in the mail." 06
On par would be a claim that inmate pain depends on the appearance
of pain. At other times, however, a self-fulfilling prophecy will be perfectly plausible. Consider negative expectations and dating. It might
not be surprising, given the degree of personal influence, if those who
anxiously expect relationships to end are more likely to help prompt
the quick end of a relationship. And evidence exists for this proposition. In a leading study involving Columbia University student couples
who were asked to maintain journals about their relationships, preexisting anxious expectations of rejection led the subjects to perceive
ambiguous cues negatively and to behave differently during conflicts
in ways that decreased the probability of a prolonged relationship. 0
Seeing a correspondence between belief and result is not the same
as understanding the undergirding mechanism, however. To fully
comprehend self-fulfilling prophecies, you must know the environments in which appearance, perception, and belief form in ways that
encourage reality to align with them. 0 8 The fundamentals of the bank
106 The Secret to Riches at 1:o3, THE SECRET, http://thesecret.tv/secret-to-riches (last visited
Mar. 25, 2012).

107 See Geraldine Downey et al., The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Close Relationships:Rejection
Sensitivity and Rejection by Romantic Partners, 75 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 545,
545-53, 556-59 (1998).
108 See id. at 557-58; see also William E. Wilkins, The Concept of a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 49
Soc. EDUC. 175, 179-80 (1976) (pointing out that self-fulfilling prophecies might be a function of
misperceptions, ignorance, values, or the environment).
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confidence example are perhaps most confidently known. A period of
remarkable stability for covered banks followed the advent of FDIC
insurance and greater federal oversight. Many factors contributed to
greater stability, to be sure, and the results have not been perfect: the
country experienced interest rate spikes and savings and loan failures
during the 198os and g99o.109 Part of the latter problem seems to
have been troubled thrifts taking riskier gambles with insured money
as the government looked on, hoping in vain for a turnaround.1 10
Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that post-1933 insurance and
regulation increased bank stability through depositor confidence."'
Elsewhere, the statistically reliable effect of self-fulfilling prophecies is limited. Among the most studied is the impact of teacher expectations on student performance. The classic study is Professor Robert
Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobsen's Pygmalion in the Classroom."2
Elementary school teachers were told which of their students were
likely to show significant intellectual growth based on a new test. But
the teachers were misled. Their students had taken a standard IQ test,
and the students supposedly marked for an intellectual spurt instead
had been marked at random. At the end of the school year, another
IQ test was administered. The randomly marked students nevertheless outpaced the IQ score increases of their classmates in a statistically
significant way."i 3 The control group for all grade levels gained about
eight points between the two tests, while the treatment group gained
about twelve; the gap for first and second graders was about fifteen
points and nine points, respectively.1 14
Yet it was always unclear precisely which mechanisms drove Pygmalion's impressive results - how exactly teachers might have acted
differently toward the marked students, and how marked students experiencing special treatment reacted. The authors warned that their
results might be sensitive to the particular student population and surrounding community.115 That warning turned out to be sound, if not
always heeded during the ensuing excitement. What we can say with

109 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 43, at 24-25, 29-30.
110

See Richard Scott Carnell, A PartialAntidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improve-

ment Act of r99,

12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 322-24 (1993) (arguing that regulators of

banks and thrifts had incentives to favor forbearance excessively); Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for Deregulation, 23 YALE J. ON REG. I, 15
(2006) (describing the moral hazard problem).
1 See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 43, at 47, 309-io; Diamond & Dybvig, supra note
55, at 401.

112 ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM
61-97

(1968).
113 See id. at 74-82.
114 See id. at 74-76.
1s

See id. at 96 n.4.
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some confidence now is that "self-fulfilling prophecies in the classroom
do exist, but they are generally small, fragile, and fleeting."" 6
No simple restatement of how to prompt self-fulfilling prophecies
seems possible at this date. Researchers indicate that several factors
might be relevant, including the novelty of the situation and the incentives for observers to acquire accurate information."' But these are
hypotheses. A more powerful message from this literature is that context matters. While we have reason to believe that self-fulfilling
prophecies occur in a variety of situations," 8 we do not always have a
comfortable grip on when and how they happen.
(b) Necessity and Efficacy. - As with the bridge model, issues of
need and efficacy deserve acknowledgement. When a self-fulfilling
prophecy is in play, there remains the question of whether to instigate
or inhibit the dynamic. Were it possible to increase student intelligence significantly by merely increasing teacher expectations, broad
support for that strategy might follow - bracketing objections to the
questionable tactic of systematically deceiving teachers. Other efforts
to control appearances are at least equally debatable. Government
deposit insurance paired with regulation is one method of reducing
bank runs without the inconveniences of bank holidays, but there are
downsides, apart from attendant taxation. A deposit insurance program can backfire. If the program is not coupled with accurate riskbased premiums or effective regulation of bank reserves and investments, depositors might monitor their banks less seriously and banks
might become too happy to make low-probability/high-return loans." 9
116 Lee Jussim & Kent D. Harber, Teacher Expectations and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies:Knowns
and Unknowns, Resolved and Unresolved Controversies, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 131, 142 (2005) (surveying studies and finding coefficients for treatment to be around o.1 or
0.2); see also id. at IS2 ("Although typically weak, some large self-fulfilling prophecies have been
found especially regarding members of some at-risk groups; although self-fulfilling prophecies dissipate, they may endure in diluted form for years.").
117 See id. at 142, 147 (discussing theory and evidence for the notions that self-fulfilling prophecies are more likely in circumstances that are new to the participants, while stereotype effects
weaken as observational information accumulates).
11 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Rub6n G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of
Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. i, 2 (1998) (examining selffulfilling prophecies in immigration decisions); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1640
(1991) (discussing a vicious circle of statistical discrimination and employee decisions not to invest
in human capital); see also Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the
Equality of Men and Women: A Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, ig8i
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 583, 633-36 (similar); cf Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination
Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228, 233 (1986) (noting the difficulty of identifying the effects of
statistical discrimination).
119 See Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 220 (1988). The
FDIC now attempts to vary assessments according to each bank's risk. See generally Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. io672 (Feb. 25, 2011).
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The savings and loan crisis has been associated with this moral hazard.120 There also is evidence from a range of countries that government insurance can actually undercut financial sector stability, depending on how the program is designed.121
Cynicism about regulation in the post-Camelot era comes easily too easily, in my view. Dark theories should not overwhelm convincing experience, and many decades of reliable banking provide that
kind of experience-based evidence. 12 2 Regardless, the financial sector,
like others, is subject to politics that generates its own imperatives.
Popular demand for increased reliability cannot be ignored in the real
world. But nor should we forget the usual complexity of engineering
self-fulfilling prophecies. Their possibility makes the analysis more exciting and more taxing. This examination should consider the chance
of appearance effectively swaying reality based on theory and evidence, the need for aligning the two, and the costs of proceeding in this
way. Everything depends on this kind of analysis, however challenging it may be.
C. Institutional Choice and Design Problems
Finally, crosscutting issues of institutional choice and design call for
recognition. The familiar idea is that a decision's character and quality depend on the structure of the decision process. 2 3 Societies face
trade-offs when designing each institution and even more trade-offs
when allocating decisions among institutions. The standard advice
from theorists is to compare decision costs along with error costs
across different institutional designs and institutional options. Some
institutions will be frugal in churning out decisions, others expensive;
some will be reliably correct, others more error-prone. Such differences
are partly a function of healthy incentives and relevant expertise,
which are often, and sadly, inversely related.12 4 Furthermore, designers should account for longer-term dynamic effects of institutional set120

See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?A Capsule Social and Economic History of the

19gos, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 278 (2004).
121 Ash Demirgiiq-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 1373, 1402 (2002) (studying
explicit, government-run deposit insurance programs between 1980 and 1997).
122 Also worth noting are near-substitutes for banks, such as deposit facilities that are subject to
less regulation, which makes regulation more like an option that people select into. See Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91
MICH. L. REV. 237, 267-68, 271-73 (1992). There remains the issue of systemic risk from a shadow banking system. See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND:

THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010).
123 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN

LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994); David L. Weimer, Institutional Design:
Overview, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN I, 12 (David L. Weimer ed., 1995).
124 See Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 6oi, 661 (2oo6).
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tings, where predictable.125 There also is the possibility that a decision
is best left uninstitutionalized. Decision costs plus error costs plus
problematic dynamic effects could mean that a supposedly social decision should be individualized.12 6
The number of appearance justifications precludes specific advice
about the allocation of power. Their variety affects the proper basis
for aesthetic choices, the importance of public confidence, the magnitude of transparency problems, the mechanics of self-fulfilling prophecies, and so on. However, two features of appearance justifications do
make them seem special for institutional analysis. They cut in different directions.
On the one hand, appearance justifications may come with a high
risk of self-serving motivation, facilitated by a lack of transparency.
Whether the appearance managers are politicians, corporate executives, union leaders, or anyone else, outsiders may worry that false impressions are being generated for the purpose of hoarding power.
Concerns escalate when decisionmakers control their images without
checks to ensure correspondence with their actual performance. True,
outsiders suffer from expertise shortages that diminish the trustworthiness of their second-guesses. But expertise deficits pervade institutional choice problems, and they do not seem systematically different
for appearance justifications. A relatively high risk of officials carrying out selfish designs flows from information asymmetries. This risk
distinguishes many appearance arguments, insofar as outsider incompetence is less troubling than insider motivation problems. Wariness is
therefore in order when decisionmakers defend themselves based on
pleasant appearances.
On the other hand, only a subset of appearance justifications is
susceptible to this risk of bad motives. Aside from occasions when information asymmetries are minor, the risk is particularly great for
bridge models but not for bank models and even less so for clock models. Concern about selfishness peaks when appearance managers
create images of their performance that cannot influence the reality of
their conduct backstage. When reality will be pulled toward appearance over time, however, the transparency problem fades - and so
does the concern about motivations. Outsiders need not be so worried
whether decisionmakers are truly motivated by good or ill as long as
the appearance is consistent with a normatively attractive outcome.
There is then more ground for deference favoring expert decisionmakers.

125 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 78-79 (2oo6) (suggesting

testable hypotheses regarding cross-institutional interaction).
126 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
5-7 (1962).
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None of the above avoids the task of identifying the most likely
appearance/reality relationships. Even if bank models indicate less deference while bridge models indicate the opposite, evaluators must
choose a model. At times this will be uncontroversial, as in the lethal
injection case. Situations like those are better suited to oversight by
outsiders, being as well-educated as they reasonably can be. But the
true relationship among appearance, perception, belief, and behavior is
at least occasionally foggy. How these considerations net out will depend on additional detail.
IV. Two APPLICATIONS

As we have seen, references to appearance and reality often refer to
the same proposition. When they do, several relationships are possible.
I have emphasized three: reality might be insulated from appearance
(the bridge model), appearance might help pull reality into alignment
over time (the bank model), or reality might collapse into appearance
(the clock model). Each model requires a value set to be normatively
useful, and each presents issues of cost, need, and efficacy within an
institutional setting. But each suggests a different set of evaluative
questions for appearance justifications. In simple terms, the bridge
model often triggers transparency concerns, the bank model tends to
eliminate them, and the clock model is often applicable regardless.
What people call an appearance is usually significant for its own sake,
but sometimes official manipulation of appearance away from an associated reality also causes concern, and at other times those worries
should wane amid the aligning force of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
These general impressions are now ready for more concrete application. The possibilities are countless, even considering only contemporary government decisions. In addition to disparate examples referenced above - such as deposit insurance, voter identification, and
lethal injections - the list includes ongoing debates over stimulus policies to build consumer and investor confidence, religious symbols
placed on government property to reflect mainstream culture,12 7 antidiscrimination law as a tool to increase investment in human capital,12 8
legislative districts apparently drawn according to racial lines,129 ap-

127 See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 65, at 143-44 (discussing possible objections to such practices);
see also McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 86o (2005).
128 See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, supra note i18, at 633-36; Strauss, supra note i18, at 1626-27; see
also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) ("[The university's] admissions
policy ... makes the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy.").
129 See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 66, at 506-16; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 63o, 647
(1993) ("[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.").
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pearance-based ethics rules for legislators and bureaucrats,130 and the
proper standard for judicial recusal.13 This is only a start.
All of these debates can be compared under the models for appearance/reality relationships emphasized above. But each has special
nuances. Instead of canvassing a large number of applications in speculative fashion, this Part reexamines two modern debates. The discussion can then be fairly in-depth, though not conclusive. It will illuminate the more general analytic framework and how the parts fit
together. For these purposes, I have chosen courtroom debates over
campaign finance regulation and policy debates over broken windows
policing. Within these debates, moreover, I will concentrate on candidate contribution limits and policing strategies designed to reduce violent crime. These two applications make for a constructive discussion:
they have lasting prominence in legal scholarship, they are the subject
of intriguing recent study by empiricists, and, when compared using
the same general framework, their discussion manifests sharply different gaps.
A. Campaign Finance Regulation
i. Litigation Under the Bridge Model. - The Supreme Court and
the advocates before it treat the appearance justification for campaign
finance regulation as if government were the proverbial bridge. Justices show varying levels of sympathy toward elected officials' worries
about public confidence,1 32 but this worry consistently follows a causal
path from perceived official misconduct to citizen demoralization and
loss of confidence in government. The ultimate dangers are not fully
specified but they seem to be much like those of a bridge made useless
by its risk-ridden reputation. And low confidence, low participation
levels, and low respect for official decisions undoubtedly undermine
effective government.

130 See, e.g., PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPRO-

PRIETY 2-5 (1997) (criticizing overused charges of apparently unethical behavior); see also United
States v. Nat'l leasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 473 (1995) ("Congress reasonably could assume that payments of honoraria to judges or high-ranking officials .. . might generate a similar
appearance of improper influence.").
131 See, e.g., Fredrick Schumann, "The Appearance of Justice":Public Justificationin the Legal
Relation, 66 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 189, 196-97 (2oo8); see also Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 817-18 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Because courts control neither the
purse nor the sword, their authority ultimately rests on public faith in those who don the robe.").
132 For expression of such worries by elected officials, see, for example, KURT HOHENSTEIN,
COINING CORRUPTION 225-26 (2007), which recounts Senator Howard Baker's concerns about

public confidence during debates over post-Watergate campaign finance legislation, and JOHN
MCCAIN WITH MARK SALTER, WORTH THE FIGHTING FOR 337 (2002), which declares that

"[q]uestions of honor are raised as much by appearances as by reality in politics, and because they
incite public distrust, they need to be addressed."
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Courtroom attention to this public relations problem developed between World War II and Watergate. Consider Hatch Act 133 cases. In
1947, the Court rejected an as-applied free speech challenge to the Act
asserted by a U.S. Mint employee who wanted to serve as a party
ward boss.13 4 The majority opinion relied on a sizable catalog of factors without clearly invoking public perception. 3 5 By 1973, the arguments had shifted. United States Civil Service Commission v. Nation1 3 6 again vindicated
al Ass'n of Letter Carriers
the Hatch Act, but this
time the Court relied on the appearance problem explicitly: "[I]t is not
only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid
practicing political justice," the majority reasoned, "but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the
system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent." 3 7
We cannot be certain why the Court turned to appearances. The
government's lawyers did not press the idea in briefing or oral argument. Worth noting, however, is that Letter Carriers was decided during an era with waves of social unrest and a crisis of confidence in major institutions - government included. The Watergate break-in had
finally escalated into a premier scandal, 3 s while the Vietnam War had
not done the federal government's reputation any favors. "[F]rom
1964 to 1970, there was a virtual explosion of anti-government feeling" 39 that was "sustained by the Watergate experience."o40 True,
showcasing official perfidy is awkward for government attorneys defending regulation. It amounts to a claim that one's superiors are so
corrupt that they require license to restrain themselves and perhaps
innocent parties as well. But the appearance justification goes down
easier. A practical problem of corrupt appearance can exist even if
133 5 U.S.C. H§ 7321-7326 (2oo6).
134 See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91-92 & nn.23-24, 103-04 (1947).
135 See id. at 96-104 (citing tradition, deference to Congress, threats to efficiency, threats to

government "integrity" when citizens might not receive service without political connections, and
support for the law in "informed public opinion," id. at 103).
136 413 U.S. 548 (1973)-

137 Id. at 565 (listing other regulatory interests as well).
138 H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman were purged after oral argument in Letter Carriers but before the decision issued. See Laurence Stern & Haynes Johnson, 3 Top Nixon Aides,
Kleindienst Out; President Accepts Full Responsibility; Richardson Will Conduct New Probe,
WASH. POST, May I, 1973, at Ai.
139 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP

16

(983).
140 Id. at 18; see also ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND COURTS 42-43
(1988); John R. Alford, We're All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 19581996, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 29-31 (John R.

Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (noting that few people expressed full or no trust in
"the government in Washington" and that the shift was mostly from trust "most of the time" to
"some of the time").
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corrupt bargains are rare in fact. This problem must have seemed all
too real in

1973.

The landmark Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
14 2
and the Supreme Court imported the appearance
1974141 followed,
justification in Buckley v. Valeo.143 "Here, as [with the Hatch Act],
Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence 'is also critical . . . if confidence in the sys-

tem of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent."' 14 4 This argument was not enough to preserve every element
of the legislation; the Court invalidated caps on independent expenditures.14 5 In addition to supposedly greater constitutional value for
spending uncoordinated with candidate campaigns, the majority
thought that these expenditures presented less risk of corrupt bargains
between spenders and candidates. 146 Yet the Court did rely on the appearance of corruption in upholding dollar limits on contributions to
Here the risks of actual corruption were considered
candidates."'4
higher and thus the problem of corrupt appearance seemed worse.
The appearance justification thus played a modest supporting role
in Buckley, as it has in cases since. Knowing exactly how modest is
difficult. But consider this: there seems to be no campaign finance decision holding that the regulatory interest in fighting corruption was
insufficient but that the interest in combating corrupt appearance was
strong enough.1 48 Equally notable, the appearance justification has
always been theoretically stunted. Judges may worry about public confidence in government, but they do not assert that the appearance of
corruption also helps cause actual corruption. "Leave the perception
of impropriety unanswered," Justice Souter once wrote, "and the cyni141 Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.

142 For helpful background, see MUTCH, supra note 140, at 1-82, and Richard L. Hasen, The
Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 345 (Richard W. Garnett &
Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
143 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).

144 Id. at 27 (omission in original) (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
145 Id. at 5 1.
146 See id. at 47.

147 See id. at 27 ("Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements
is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions."). As this quotation
suggests, the appearance justification has been intertwined with arguments for prophylactic regulation. Corrupt bargains can be difficult to detect, and broad rules might assure the public that
corruption is not widespread. But the argument for prophylaxis, see supra note Ii, can stand on
its own without making the reduction of corrupt appearance a significant independent goal.
148 The closest counterexample I have seen is Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F. d 1og5 ( th Cir. 2003),
3
9
which indicated that soft-money contributions to political parties create corrupt appearances regardless of how the money is actually spent, id. at 113 n.24, though the court also relied on an
undue-influence rationale, id.
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cal assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance."1 4 9 Government lawyers have argued in similar terms. In Buckley, for instance,
the Justice Department relied on Letter Carriers and its worry about
public demoralization,15 0 not on the risk of a downward spiral into
widespread corruption in fact. On this score, legal scholarship is not
more exotic. Appearance justifications for campaign finance regulation are not much different in character from courtroom arguments.' 5 '
Despite newsworthy deregulatory themes, the liberation of corporate and union treasuries for independent expenditures in Citizens
United v. FEC152 did not mark a major change in the processing of
appearance justifications. 53 In this respect, the Court took the orthodox approach. Again, the feared consequence was sagging public confidence,15 4 not more actual corruption. 5 5 And, as usual, the Justices
did not ask whether the political system might falsely appear less corrupt with regulation in place. Finally, the case is consistent with a
judicial tradition of unflinching empirical claims. Ten years earlier, in
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,15 6 a majority relied on its
own sense of plausibility to uphold contribution limits as an effective

149 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (emphasis added).
150 See Brief for the Attorney General & the FEC at 22, Buckley, 424 U.S. i (Nos. 75-436, 75437) (indicating that "legislating to restore public confidence in elected government" is important
"in times of deep public suspicion and apathy"). Popular demand might be an additional reason
for regulation, but these public-pacification arguments still fall under the bridge model.
151 The mountain of legal scholarship on campaign finance regulation touches on appearance
arguments, but sustained treatment is rare. See, e.g., MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13o, at

2, 5 (asserting that focus on appearance of ethical behavior has been counterproductive); D. Bruce
La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears About "Big Money" and
Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 713-14 (2000) (presenting a practitioner's argu-

ment for stronger evidence of efficacy); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 394-95, 397 (2oog) (arguing for a broadly defined anticorruption norm
and downplaying the significance of appearance). See generally Andrew N. DeLaney, Note, Appearance Matters: Why the State Has an Interest in Preventing the Appearance of Voting Fraud,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 847 (2oo8) (analogizing from campaign finance to voter identification). Perhaps the most important law journal article on the subject is empirical. See Nathaniel Persily &
Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines ConstitutionalLaw, 153 U. PA. L. REV. I 19 (2004).
152 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).

153 See id. at 901-03, 908-i i (relying on Buckley for the contribution/expenditure distinction).
154 See id. at go.
1ss Perhaps the most important doctrinal turn of events was a narrowing of the regulatory interest in preventing "corruption" to quid pro quo deals along with the dismissive treatment of
"undue influence," see infra note 197 and accompanying text, a concept that, as Professor Heather
Gerken has suggested to me, is more clearly related to political equality commitments. My criticism of the Court's approach to appearance arguments, I should stress, does not depend on a
broader understanding of "corruption." I am unsatisfied either way.
156 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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method of reducing real and perceived corruption.15 7 "The quantum
of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised," Justice Souter told us.s15 The reasoning in Citizens United is not so different. Justice Kennedy asserted
that "independent expenditures, including those made by corporations,
do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of [quid pro quo] corruption"159 and that "[t]he appearance of influence or access ... will
not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy."' 60 Justices
supporting and opposing regulation seem equally comfortable estimating the effect on public opinion.
Perhaps this fact is unsurprising. Judges are hardly the most careful empiricists. And they are understandably sympathetic, at some
level, to public relations problems in the rest of government. Aside
from the crass observation that the threat is faced by the same system
that provided their commissions, judges have for centuries relied on
public confidence to maintain a role in social life. 161 This experience
must make the bridge model seem natural for campaign finance cases.
Judges wearing the same kind of robe or using a broad recusal standard might influence observers' impressions, but one can scarcely
think that those impressions will seriously affect actual levels of judicial propriety. Believing in dispassionate judges - something Justice
Jackson suggested was "mystical"1 62 - does not convert the optimistic
view into reality. Familiar logic, no doubt, for judges hearing campaign finance cases.
2. Unvetted Transparency and Efficacy Problems. - The question
is whether this particular logic has been all too familiar. In my view,
the answer is yes: judges have been insufficiently demanding of appearance justifications under the bridge model and insufficiently creative in ignoring the bank model.
(a) Transparency. - Criticizing courts for permissiveness on the
appearance justification might seem counterintuitive. The argument

157 See id. at 393-95 (pointing to mass media accounts of shady political dealings, public support for contribution limits, and divided scholarship investigating the relationship between contributions and voting behavior).
158 Id. at 391; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003) (repeating Justice Souter's
admonition).
159 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
The majority did later observe that the record in
McConnell had not identified instances of independent-expenditure quids exchanged for vote
quos. See id. at gzo.
160 Id.
161 Cf Caperton v. AT. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266-67 (2009) (relying partly on
public-confidence problems in requiring recusal of a state judge based on large independent expenditures in a judicial election).
162 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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has, at best, questionable adjudicative potency. But in operating under the bridge model, judges have been disturbingly timid. My objection is not that the government's confidence problem is insignificant; it
might be more serious than any government lawyer is willing to allege.
The basic problem is that judges entertain appearance justifications
without assuring others that the actual incidence and likelihood of corruption is at least as low as the appearance that regulators hope to
create. Judges provide little reason to believe that a good reality accompanies any good appearance attributable to regulation. The advertising might be false.
And this possibility is a major problem under the bridge model.
Any presumption of transparency in democracy has special force when
it comes to campaign regulation. The targets for appearance manipulation are voters or citizens or some other cohort in good standing.
They are considered principals in democratic theory - the opposite of
"enemies of the state." Although it might be overcome by other considerations, the standard presumption must be that this cohort is entitled to some assurance that the engineered appearance of campaign
finance regulation roughly aligns with the actual effect on corruption.
This position leans on more than merely abstract commitments to democracy. In this situation, officials are doing more than communicating their claims to freedom from corruption through talk or selfregulation. They are attempting to reprogram the paths of third-party
political resources. Even if observers should disregard restrictions on
contributor choices, there remains the risk of overconfidence (or, as one
might put it today, insufficient lack of confidence). If political outsiders underestimate corruption levels because of regulation that only
looks effective, those outsiders might not monitor the political system
as closely as they otherwise would, and they might not demand reform
as strongly as they should.
From this view, even Justice Kennedy is too soft. Critics in his
camp complain that much campaign finance law is ham-handed overkill against legitimate spending on political speech that also protects
incumbents or preferred speakers.16 3 But this critique does not question the law's ability to cut quid pro quo corruption in proportion to
alleged gains in good-looking appearances. In fact, there seems to be
tacit agreement among the Justices that contribution caps reduce actual corruption, maybe a lot. Certainly the defenders of contribution
limits hold that the caps will reduce the frequency of corruption;16 4
163 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 286-88, 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nixon, 528 U.S.
at 411-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164 For example, see Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, supra note 13, among other arguments, of course.
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they do not confess that corruption is widespread and then ask for authority to convince the public otherwise. True, today's limits might
well deter the exchange of campaign contributions for official favors
from presidents and federal legislators. The powers of these officials
are worth more than a few thousand dollars, one would think. 165 But
nothing close to a guarantee has been given that public appearance attributable to contribution limits will reflect the actual prevalence of
such deals. The public should want evidence, which is difficult to obtain: participants in unlawful bargains ordinarily prefer to keep their
dealings private. If, however, the best-justified belief is that the real
level of corruption is uncertain within wide bounds, then this understanding should form the logical footing for evaluating appearancebased justifications - not an optimistic assumption.1 66 Officials are
free to defend contribution caps based on other consequences, such as
asserted increases in political participation. But they are not entitled
to a quick and quiet conversion of uncertainty into permission.
Finally, contribution limits risk information losses in the form of
candidate signals.167 Candidate choices about how to finance their
campaigns might help voters distinguish good types from bad types. A
candidate who refuses large contributions might be more credible
when she warrants that her official judgment will depend on the best
interests of her constituents or her campaign platform, not the whim of
the highest bidder. But across-the-board regulation is unlikely to
create a separating equilibrium. If the same rule binds all competing
politicians, they are indistinguishable within the domain of prohibited
conduct. Granted, politicians may constrain themselves further than
the law requires, as when candidates refuse or return contributions
from unpopular donors. But additional distinguishing behavior should
be expected in the absence of regulation.1 68 Election law could instead
authorize candidates to choose their own limits on contributions, if
any, and then advertise and enforce those promises.16 9 Potential in-

165 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I), (c) (2oo6); FED. ELECTION COMM'N, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
FOR 2011-2012 (20II) (showing inflation-adjusted limits for 2011-2012, including a $2500 cap on

individual contributions to federal candidates per election, and a $3o,8oo cap on individual contributions to national party committees per year). These limits do not account for bundling.
166 See supra pp. 1589-90 (addressing uncertainty).
167 See generally POSNER, supra note 88.
168 Recorded votes on campaign finance legislation might provide useful signals, but officials
do not seem to support, say, biennial reauthorization of these laws.
169 If there is a signaling justification for statutory contribution limits, it must be institutionwide. Congress, for instance, might be competing with other government institutions and the private sector for the confidence of people concerned with social problems. But that story is more
complicated - in part, evaluators would need to know the extent to which the competitor institutions impose campaign finance-like restrictions on behavior - and it would not recover the value
of lost information about individual candidates, anyway.
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formation loss under current law only deepens the transparency problem associated with today's contribution limits.
(b) Efficacy. - The appearance justification for contribution limits also presents an important efficacy question. If such regulation
does not positively influence how outsiders perceive the political system, there will be only costs, without an effective response to the potentially demoralizing perceptions of corruption. It is hard to believe
that contribution limits have zero effect on anyone's corruption perceptions compared to legalizing contributions of all sizes, but the extent and character of the effect is worth questioning.
The issue has been investigated recently, although expert empirical
study remains scarce.17 0 Most notably, Professors Nathaniel Persily
and Kelli Lammie attacked the claim that corruption perceptions follow campaign finance regulation."' They reviewed polls asking respondents, for example, whether they believe that there are many
"crooked" people running the government and whether a few big interests run government.172 These numbers have changed, but not obviously in response to law. Actually, the study's data showed perceptions improving after Watergate and the 1974 legislation, but the
authors emphasized that perceptions deteriorated after the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002173 (BCRA). Several causes might explain the trends. Indeed, Persily and Lammie found statistically significant correlations between answers to the corruption questions and variables such as approval of the President's job performance, favorable
views of the economy, and relatively high levels of trust in general. 174
The study asked an essential question, but the answer is unfortunately only suggestive. Regulation was not an independent variable in
the study.' 7 5 Although the raw numbers are enough to indicate that
past legal change has not dramatically affected public opinion, that
impression does not indicate the magnitude of the effect, if any, from
various regulatory regimes. More radical legal change - such as robust public financing or elimination of contribution limits - might
move the numbers further. In addition, the sensitivity of public opinion might change. Rising pessimism could help explain improved perceptions after the 1974 amendments yet worsening perceptions after
BCRA, without assurance that deregulation would not threaten gov170 See David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and PoliticalEfficacy: Evidence from the States, 5 ELECTION L.J. 23, 23 (2006) ("[N]o study has directly examined the connection between existing campaign finance laws and how citizens view their government.").
171 See Persily & Lammie, supra note 151, at i19.

172 See id. at 145-46 (drawing on the National Election Study).
173 Pub. L. No. 107-115, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47
U.S.C.); see also Persily & Lammie, supra note 151, at 147-49 & figs.
174 See Persily & Lammie, supra note 151, at 50, 156-57, 16o, 167 n.iig, 168.
175 See id. at

145.
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ernment's image. Deregulation is a change about which one can be
pessimistic, too. Further, there is an identification problem here: respondents' perceptions of corruption might be influencing some of the
independent variables, such as presidential approval. Perceptions of
corruption during the latter part of the Nixon Administration surely
affected that President's numbers. To the extent that such perceptions
negatively impact approval ratings, forces that influence corruption
perceptions, including law, might become more important.
Another step forward came from Professors James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen. Their dependent variable was the corruption perceptions of journalists covering state legislatures, who were surveyed
in 1998 as a clever proxy for actual corruption levels.'7 6 Journalists
are, of course, freakishly well informed. Still, Alt and Lassen were interested in the effects of regulation. It turned out that four factors explained fifty-seven percent of the variation in journalists' corruption
estimates: statewide education levels (negatively correlated), per capita
government revenue (positively correlated), metropolitan population
share (positively correlated), and income level (negatively correlated)."' These findings left room for other factors, including law."
"Campaign expenditures restrictions, by and on behalf of a candidate,
are associated significantly with lower corruption,"' 9 the authors concluded, speculating that such regulation might counteract the fundraising advantages of incumbents.1 s0 This correlation persisted after the
authors added a host of control variables, including measures of government size and regulatory burden.8 " Alt and Lassen did not better
specify their campaign finance regulation variable,1 82 so the signifi176 See James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, The PoliticalEconomy of Institutions and CorJ. THEORETICAL POL. 341, 350 (2003). Another proxy is corrup-

ruption in American States, 1s

tion prosecutions or convictions, see, e.g., Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, Corruption and
Government Size: A DisaggregatedAnalysis, 97 PUB. CHOICE 07, I14 (1998), which is partly a
function of law enforcement priorities. In a hideously dysfunctional regime, however, there would
not be a positive correlation between corruption prosecutions and high corruption levels. A third
proxy involves surveys of people's experiences with corruption. See infra section IV.A. 3 , pp.
1609-18.
177 See Alt & Lassen, supra note 176, at 352-53 & tbl.i.
178 See id. at 354-55 & tbl.2 (finding that states with direct initiative opportunities without legislative vetoes were associated with lower journalist corruption perceptions). The theory is that
initiatives allow citizens to unbundle the package of policies otherwise offered by political agents.
See also id. at 354 tbl.2, 356 (same for states with higher relative government salaries). The
theory is that a lucrative government job makes engaging in corruption less attractive.
" Id. at 355.
180 Id. at 354 tbl.2, 355.
181 See id. at 357-59 & tbl.3 .
182 Limits on the total amount spent by candidates would presumably be held unconstitutional,
except as a condition on receiving public financing. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-54
(1976) (per curiam). Correspondence with the authors indicates that they used 1996 data from the
Book of the States on whether states imposed restrictions on candidate expenditures or expendi-
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cance of their finding is cloudy. Nonetheless, their study offers some
support for the notion that law can affect the appearance of corruption
among professional observers.
Using an analogous approach, Professors David Primo and Jeffrey
Milyo broke down state-level campaign finance law into five categories, including candidate contribution limits.s 3 The authors then studied the relationship of these regulatory categories to perceived political efficacy, such as whether respondents agreed that "[p]eople like me
don't have any say about what the government does."184 This measure is not exactly perception of corruption, nor does it target perceptions about state government.8 5 And the study tested the influence of
any kind of candidate contribution limit, regardless of how high or
how loosely enforced.186 In other respects, though, the study is useful.
The time frame was long; the authors investigated whether regulation
tended to lag behind efficacy perceptions as a way of getting at the reverse-causation problem; and the authors controlled for several other
plausible influences, including partisan affiliation and identification
with the party in power.'18 The results were mixed. Public financing
was associated with lower levels of perceived efficacy, while disclosure
laws and contribution limits on organizations (corporations, unions,
and political action committees) correlated with marginally higher levels.', Interestingly, Primo and Milyo found no statistically significant
relationship between efficacy perceptions and contribution limits that
cover both organizations and individuals. 8 9 A cautious inference is
that law can modestly influence efficacy perceptions but that this effect should not be assumed.
The most provocative study is the most recent. Professor Beth Ann
Rosenson found that an index of campaign finance laws is positively
tures on behalf of a candidate. The latter might be a form of contribution under First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 24.
183 Primo & Milyo, supra note 1 70, at
31.
184 Id. at 30; see id. at 29-30 (relying on National Election Studies surveys from 1948 through
2ooo). On average, sixty percent disagreed with the statement quoted in the text above. Id. at 30.
185 See id. at 3o n.i6 (recognizing the problem).
186 See id. at 29. Few states imposed any limit on individual contributions before 1976, but
about two-thirds had them by 2ooo; a majority of states imposed limits on organizational contributions before 1976, and this number drifted upward to over forty states by 2ooo. See id. at 2829 & fig.i. Also worth noting are changes in the number of state-level expenditure limits which plunged from about half the states to zero after Buckley - and disclosure laws - which
surged from over half the states to every state during the same time frame. See id. at 29 & fig.1.
187 See id. at 31-32.

188 See id. at 33-34 & tbl.3 (finding a three percent increase in likelihood of reported efficacy in
states with a disclosure law, a four percent increase in states with an organizational contribution
limit, and a five percent decrease in states with a public financing system). These effects were
extremely modest compared to people in the jurisdiction having a college degree or a high school
diploma. See id. at 33 tbl.2.
189 See id. at 34 tbl.3.
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correlated with journalists' perception of corruption.1 90 Controlling
for several variables,19 1 journalists covering state legislatures tend to
report somewhat higher levels of corruption when this index of regulation is higher. As with the Alt and Lassen study, the use of journalist
perceptions is not the best stand-in for public perceptions. 19 2 Moreover,
both studies are cross-sectional snapshots; they do not investigate variation in legal regimes and perceptions over time, which provides better
insight into causation. It would not be shocking to learn that political
systems plagued by widespread perceptions of corruption respond with
formal legal changes that mildly dampen those perceptions without
eliminating them. That said, Rosenson does employ an instrumentalvariables technique to help with the reverse-causation problem of (reporters') corruption perceptions possibly driving the adoption of campaign finance laws.1 9 3 And her findings are a proper warning that
reform efforts in low-confidence environments can backfire.
These studies are not all directly on point, and they are bounded by
the variation in state law. Moving from restrictive contribution limits
to none is an uncommon experience. Nor can researchers be sure that
the relationship of regulation to public perception at the state and federal levels is the same. Different audiences might pay different kinds
of attention to system changes depending on their locus. But the limits
of existing empirical study provide grounds for healthy skepticism, not
disregard. The power of campaign regulation to influence public perceptions greatly, especially in an era of low background confidence levels, is open to serious question. And serious investigation into such
questions is, in some respects, only beginning to accelerate. So far, the
judicial debate has been left behind.
3. Potentialfor the Bank Model. - What are the alternatives to
the bridge model? The clock model is not terribly compelling. The
appearance and reality of quid pro quo corruption are hardly conceptual equivalents, the latter's social meaning might well be quite negative regardless of formal law, and 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I)1 9 4 is not pretty
enough to be defended on aesthetics alone. Regardless, there is an intriguing bank model for campaign finance regulation. Unlike the
bridge model, the bank model reduces transparency concerns, as appearance becomes a resource for gauging reality instead of a tool for
deception.
Furthermore, the chance of a beneficial self-fulfilling
prophecy counterbalances concerns about regulatory efficacy. If per190 See Beth Ann Rosenson, The Effect of PoliticalReform Measures on Perceptions of Corruption, 8 ELECTION L.J. 31, 34, 40 (2009).
191 Id. at 37-38.

192 See id. at 34.
193 See id. at 35-36.
194 See sources cited supra note 165.
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ceptions change, the expected benefit is larger: whatever its other effects, a favorable appearance would pull reality toward lower actual
corruption levels. A bank model for campaign finance law, including
contribution limits, is theoretically appealing and thankfully subject to
increasing empirical inquiry.
(a) Theoretical Sketches. - The theory for a self-fulfilling prophecy here is fairly straightforward, although the contemplated prophecy
makes a difference. One possibility is that appearance of undue influence yields greater likelihood of such influence, and another is that appearance of quid pro quo corruption yields greater likelihood of such
corruption.19 5
The first possibility is simpler: widespread perception of undue political influence (somehow defined) logically begets actual undue influence (similarly defined). People choose whether to participate in the
political system, such as by voting, and participation is costly. If many
people believe that the system is rigged in the sense that other people
have much greater influence on outcomes, the first set of people might
not participate in the first place. Their subjectively expected impact
on outcomes would fall without the cost of participation falling in tandem. A sophisticated understanding of political participation is admittedly necessary here; a crude rational actor model might predict zero
turnout on election day, regardless. But it is not difficult to believe
that those who participate for expressive purposes or to comply with
social norms can end up disaffected from the political system when
subsets of the population appear to be pulling the strings. These selfperceived outsiders might unplug completely, which only reduces the
likelihood that any given person's values will be taken into account.
More people dropping out might make it socially comfortable for still
others to do the same.
This undue-influence prophecy is not free from doubt, obviously.
Outrage can take many forms, including plugging into a system to
change it. Occupy Wall Street might not have a clear policy platform,
but it counts as something other than political inaction. Nor is campaign finance reform a surefire mechanism for adjusting perceptions of
undue influence; 196 it might be insignificant compared to, for instance,
lowering the costs of voting or controlling gerrymanders. And different cohorts of people will feel differently about what influence is "due"
195 There are other forms of corruption and other objectives for campaign finance regulation. I
choose the two in the text because they are prevalent in contemporary legal debates.
196 See David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, The Effects of Campaign Finance Laws on Thrnout,
195o-2ooo, at 2 (Feb. 2oo6) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (finding no positive impact on turnout from state campaign finance laws post-Buckley, and
finding a negative effect from public financing post-Buckley, but finding a positive effect from
contribution limits on organizational donors pre-Buckley).
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other cohorts. In any event, the interest in correcting something called
"undue influence" has been under assault at the Supreme Court. This
interest has not clearly survived Citizens United, certainly not regarding access to public officials prompted by independent expenditures. 97
Consider it retired.
The quid pro quo-corruption prophecy is more complicated, and it
has not been a factor in litigation. Indeed, this particular dynamic
does not necessarily have anything to do with citizen demoralization,
which is the phenomenon typically singled out in court decisions. Yet
it has an enticing logic, and the theory seems perfectly admissible
without doctrinal change.
The idea is that the occasions for quid pro quo corruption will expand, and the political consequences of such corruption may recede, if
the general perception is that illicit bargains are commonplace. Imagine that a vast majority is convinced that unlawful quid pro quo
deals between citizens and officials are the norm. People believe that
such bargains are standard operating procedure and they expect the
practice to persist. Admittedly, people might have overestimated the
incidence of such corruption, but that is not our core concern any
longer. The question is how this society - with a bad appearance and
an existing reality that is good, bad, or uncertain - might operate
over time given these beliefs and expectations. One strong possibility
is that corrupt offers and acceptances will spike upward compared to a
situation in which such corruption is thought rare.
First, people often are more likely to adopt than to repudiate what
seems to be normal behavior. 98 Acting consistently with a perceived
social norm of illicit bargaining must be psychologically more comfortable than entering corrupt bargains absent such perceptions. The perceived normalization of "corrupt" bargains might well undo the negative label. Quid pro quo deals contrary to the formal law ultimately
might be considered "gift-giving" compatible with necessity, common
197 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909-10 (2oo) (Kennedy, J.) (claiming that the
regulatory interest vindicated in Buckley "was limited to quid pro quo corruption," id. at gog);
accord McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 298 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
198 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, g6
MICH. L. REV. 338, 380-81 (997) (discussing shame, esteem, internalization, and guilt). You
might think of the Minnesota tax compliance experiment at this point, although the results are not
as strong as some suggest. Compare STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP'T OF REVENUE, THE
MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT. STATE TAX RESULTS 5-6, 17-19 &
tbl.2, 25 (1996) (finding increased income reported and taxes paid by randomly selected taxpayers
who were told that tax compliance is actually the norm, at least at the p = .10 confidence level),
with Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance?Evidence from a
Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 125, 130-35 (2001) (assessing the same
experiment but reporting no statistically significant effect for included tax filers as a whole, with
some subgroups reacting positively and others negatively).
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sense, or tradition.' 99 Regardless, people can more easily discount the
prospect of social sanctions, such as shaming, if they believe that most
others are already engaged in the supposedly shameful behavior. More
people perceiving the norm can lead to more people following the
norm, which can lead to more people perceiving the norm (and so on).
Second, a perceived norm of corrupt bargaining will generate perceived competitive pressure to follow it. Citizens who deny themselves
corrupt bargains are at a disadvantage compared to those who ante up.
Self-denial amounts to unilateral disarmament in a battle for scarce
public resources and favors. Even if such resources are in fact abundant, an apparently corrupt system can push otherwise law-abiding
citizens toward bribery out of felt necessity. "If officials are generally
untrustworthy, ordinary people and businesses may believe that the
only way to get what they need is through a payoff," Professor Susan
Rose-Ackerman has observed. 200 The decision to employ this strategy
depends on an estimate of its necessity, which is a matter of appearance. More people perceiving the usefulness of such payoffs can lead
to an equilibrium in which there are more people offering such
payoffs. "[O]ur expected gain from corruption depends crucially on
the number of other people we expect to be corrupt."2 0 1
A third corruption-escalating force comes from the officials' side of
the equation. In addition to other psychological comforts, officials
might become less fearful of punishment for entering corrupt bargains
when most people consider it normal. Part of the reason could be societal shifts in ethical standards that exclude such deals from the definitions of bad behavior. But another factor is the difficulty in credibly
distinguishing oneself as a law-abiding official. Once the political system is tarnished by a reputation for corruption, it is not clear how a
participant can escape that reputation. 20 2 Attestations of ethical behavior, almost by definition, will ring hollow when perceptions of corruption are running high. Most observers of politics tend to be casual observers, and even careful observers have difficulty distinguishing
politicians on questions of ethics. 2 0 3 That these perceptions are influ-

199 But cf BO ROTHSTEIN, THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT I5, lo0-0l (2oli) (offering
evidence that people in highly "corrupt" settings tend not to internalize the norm as good behavior).
200 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Truth, Honesty and Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building
Process 16 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working
Paper No. 255, 2001); see also Emmanuelle Lavall6e et al., Corruptionand Trust in PoliticalInstitutions in Sub-SaharanAfrica 3 (Afrobarometer, Working Paper No. 102, 2oo8) ("As informal institutions replace formal rules, citizens realize that respecting the formal rules is inefficient.").
201 Pranab Bardhan, Corruptionand Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERA-

TURE 1320, 1331 (1997) (discussing a frequency-dependent-equilibria account of corruption).
202 See id. at 1334.

203 This difficulty helps account for contribution limits as institution-wide signals. See supra
pp. 1605-o6.
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enced by real levels of corruption is not enough to eliminate the degrading effect of bad appearances.
Additional forces might then tilt public officials toward corruption.
Insofar as outsiders have only a weak basis for distinguishing among
officials, self-restrained officials also become competitively disadvantaged. The corrupt quid pro quo often makes life easier for the recipient, whether by building an effective campaign or other personal
benefit. Others are that much worse off. This competitive disadvantage folds into adverse selection effects. Otherwise ethical people will
tend to opt out of public service, while those most comfortable with
corrupt bargains are more likely to select in.204 If a person wants to
act ethically and wants to enjoy a reputation for ethical behavior, why
enter an institution where people are likely to be tarred regardless? In
an environment like this, political communities "may find themselves
stuck in bad equilibria such that high-quality citizens avoid public office because so do other high-quality citizens." 2 0 5
This is an admittedly stark picture, perhaps unrealistic for the
United States in the short term. Moreover, we might spin out a different theory on which a political community begins to sense that corruption is spreading and responds with pressure for reform. 2 0 6 Anticorruption regulatory efforts can also backfire: observers might take
regulatory efforts as a sign that the corruption problem is larger than
they had thought. 207 Or the public response might be polarized. The
community might be so heterogeneous that there is no useful "average"
response to a given regulation. We might see hard-core moralists and
crooks unmoved by anticorruption campaigns, confirmed cynics and
unswerving optimists holding fast to their outlooks, rigidly ideological
camps shifting hard, but in different directions - and only a relatively
small persuadable group whose willingness to play fair depends on its
members' perceptions of how many others are equally willing. Any of
these scenarios is conceivable. 2 0 8
204 I am assuming that ethical people have a realistic alternative to government service, while
corruption-oriented people are at least equally drawn to government service. Cf Francesco
Caselli & Massimo Morelli, Bad Politicians, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 759, 760-62 (2004) (showing
multiple equilibria concerning the fraction of capable politicians based on selection effects, even if
voters have perfect information about candidate types, where less-capable people are at a
disadvantage in the private sector).
205 Id. at 778.
206 See Inna tdbelkovd & Jan Hanousek, The Power of Negative Thinking: Corruption,Perception and Willingness to Bribe in Ukraine, 36 APPLIED EcON. 383, 383 (2004) (indicating that

reformist reactions are highly contingent).
207 Because of the trend toward increasing anticorruption regulation in the United States, aside
from repeal by judicial review, the effect of deregulation on perceptions is more difficult to study.
It is nonetheless possible that regulatory efforts to create formal incentives will suggest to observers that many people share a need for such incentives.
208 I thank Dan Kahan for helping me develop these thoughts.
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But with a little creative effort, we can envision a set of pressures
on private parties and public officials that sends a political system spiraling downward, with perceived and actual quid pro quo corruption
rising in tandem. Catastrophic risks are worth taking into account
even if those risks are small. Widespread political corruption is no exception. "Unchecked," the World Bank has reported, "the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political
legitimacy to the point where even noncorrupt officials and members
of the public see little point in playing by the rules." 209
(b) Causation Challenges. - The foregoing is an image, and the
next question is whether it fits reality. The best available information
falls short of what we should demand given the severe political-system
degradation already happening in parts of the world. The hopeful
note is that serious researchers have turned their attention to the fascinating interrelationships among corrupt appearances, corruption experiences, confidence levels, and legal design. Here I will review a few
leading research efforts and the barriers to achieving a comfortable
level of certainty regarding law's role in fighting self-fulfilling corruption prophecies.
The logic of such prophecies indicates causal links that are, in principle, empirically testable. These links include: (I) the conditions under which a given law, such as a contribution limit of X dollars, will
likely influence perceptions about the frequency of quid pro quo corruption;2 10 (2) the conditions under which these perceptions increase
the likelihood of corrupt offers, their acceptance, and adverse selection
effects discussed above; and (3) the conditions under which quid pro
quo corruption is a net negative for society or otherwise wrongful.
The answer to the third question is basically uncontested in the United
States, and although a productive analysis of the issue is possible, 2 1 1 1
leave it aside in favor of live debates.
The challenge of achieving better-than-provisional answers to the
first two questions is evident. Numerous forces plausibly influence
corruption levels. 212 Among these forces are urbanization and income
209 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, THE STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD 102 (1997); accord ROTHSTEIN, supra note 199, at loo, 146 (asserting that corrupt sys-

tems are sticky); Cdbelkovd & Hanousek, supra note 206, at 383.
210 A related question is whose perceptions are likely to be influenced, not just how many people's.
211 For the possibility that corrupt bargains can rightly circumvent misguided government policy, see Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption,AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST, Nov. 1964, at 8, 11-12, which observes that a corrupt and ineffective bureaucracy

undermined Brazil's attempt to implement food price controls, and Daniel Levy, Price Adjustment Under the Table: Evidence on Efficiency-Enhancing Corruption, 23 EUR. J. POL. ECON.
423, 439-40 (2007), which examines the potential efficiencies of corruption in the Republic of

Georgia's black markets.
212 And here I leave aside the question of what should count as "corruption." See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 230-31 (2011) (using systematic influences that change the
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levels, government scope and salary levels, competition for public office and access to information about government, 2 13 not to mention
tradition and path dependence. Furthermore, a number of legal design
choices, aside from campaign finance regulation, might influence corruption perceptions and corruption frequency. These choices include
term limits, citizen initiatives, redistricting procedures, and civil service protections. 2 1 4 And corruption perceptions might usually follow
the observer's general disapproval of those in office, or the unemployment rate, or even the community's "kvetch" quotient. 2 15
We have already reviewed emerging empirical evidence on the first
question (the effect of law on corruption perceptions). The results
were mixed and modest, but sufficiently provisional to leave even minimally curious observers wanting more. Evidence on the second question (the effect of corruption perceptions on corruption levels) is in a
similar state. Scholars are beginning to understand the risk of essentially perpetual corruption resulting from the reputation crash of a political system. But only beginning.
Discomfiting illustrations do exist. Take reputationally challenged
political jurisdictions in the United States - places where corruption
is taken as a fact of life, such as Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Illinois.
The familiarity of former Illinois governors with the criminal justice
system can be explained partly by adverse selection effects and greater
opportunities for corrupt conduct, which are facilitated by expectations
that such conduct will happen. 2 1 6 Similarly, local governments that
suffer from corrupt practices along with high-profile scandals may remain trapped in a bad equilibrium. New Orleans's age-old reputation

intended influences on an institution); ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND 91 (1998) (using a loose version of "sale by government officials of government property for personal gain"); Leff, supra note 211, at 8 (using extralegal influence on policymaking or
implementation); Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-NationalStudy, 76 J. PUB.
ECON. 399, 399 (2000) (using misuse of public office for private gain). Like recent Supreme Court
majorities, I concentrate on quid pro quo trades of (campaign) cash in exchange for an official
decision. See supra note 197.
213 See Alt & Lassen, supra note 176, at 342-44; Natalia Melgar et al., The Perception of Corruption, 22 INT'L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 120, 121-22 (2010) (investigating a variety of factors
that might influence corruption perceptions around the world, such as income inequality and education, but not law or law enforcement efforts); T~eisman, supra note 212, at 399.
214 The direction of influence, if any, from some of these variables is theoretically ambiguous.
For instance, civil service protection might professionalize a bureaucracy such that its employees
refuse bribes, or it might increase corrupt bargains by providing those employees with an unwarranted sense of security.
215 See Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of
Commerce? 16 (Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper No. WP/oo/64, 2000).
216 See William Spain, A Compendium of Corrupt Illinois Governors, WALL ST. J., Dec. io,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12288519785849220i.html.

HeinOnline -- 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1615 2011-2012

1616

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:1563

must make it difficult to alter real corruption levels. 2 1 7 The same
thought applies to political systems beyond our national borders in
which appearances, expectations, and the best indicators of actual corruption all tank together. The Afghanistan example is inviting, so to
speak. Reports are that a sizable fraction of Afghanistan's public
business, ranging from the allocation of land titles to government jobs,
operates through transactions that are formally illegal and that the av-

erage person expects. 2 18
These are case studies, but broader investigations have been conducted. 2 1 9 Part of this research covers the propensity to make corrupt
offers when corruption perceptions are high rather than low. 2 2 0 A pioneering study is Professors Inna C belkovd and Jan Hanousek's work
on post-Soviet Ukraine. Their basic finding was that people reported
greater willingness to engage in bribery of officials when their perceptions of corruption were higher.2 2 1 This result is consistent with a selffulfilling prophecy theory, regardless of why the former attitude tends
to come with the latter perception or why the perception arises in the
217 As Professor Clay Gillette has suggested to me, public tolerance for corruption in New Orleans might have diminished after Hurricane Katrina. See Mike Tolson, Katrina's Mark on New
Orleans Remains 5 Years After Storm, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 29, 20o, http://www.chron.com
/news/nation-world/article/Katrina-s-mark-on-New-Orelans-remains-5-years- 1587771.php. Shifts
in public expectations regarding corruption might come from exogenous shocks, including exposure to other systems via the post-Katrina diaspora.
218 See Dexter Filkins, Afghan Corruption: Everything for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/world/asia/02iht-corrupt.I.19050534.html; Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys
indices/cpi (last updated Dec. I, 201I) (reporting aggregations of surveys on corruption perceptions and showing Afghanistan's falling from i17th out of 159 ranked countries in 2005 (scoring
2.5/10.0) to 1 79 th out of 18o in 2009 (scoring

1.3/10.0)).

For a partial success story about Indone-

sia's Anti-Corruption Commission and Anti-Corruption Court, see Simon Butt, "Unlawfulness"
and Corruption Under Indonesian Law, 45 BULL. INDONESIAN ECON. STUD.

179, 179-82

(2009), which points out the advantages of a new, specialized, and noncorrupt enforcement regime, along with the potential for overdeterrence from vague and overbroad anticorruption
norms.
219 The theoretical and empirical literature on corruption is growing with the recognition that
corrupt political regimes pose hurdles to economic development. See, e.g., Toke S. Aidt, Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 271, 271-72

(2009) (finding that corruption experiences among business managers and general corruption perceptions are negatively correlated with per capita wealth, while only the corruption-perception
measure correlated with per capita GDP changes). Additional case studies from abroad can be
found in ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988).

See also Federico Va-

rese, The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-SocialistRussia, 45 POL. STUD. 579,
580 (1997). A leading account of corruption from economic, political, and cultural perspectives is
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT (1999).
VISHNY, supra note 212, at 11-12, gl-IO8.

See also SHLEIFER &

220 See Chbelkovd & Hanousek, supra note 2o6, at 383; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Trust and Honesty in Post-Socialist Societies, 54 KYKLOS 415, 423-25 (2oo1) (reviewing perception studies and
noting a result in which respondents' predicted happiness at achieving success through bribery
depended on the perception that others were engaged in similar transactions).
221 See Cdbelkovd & Hanousek, supra note 206, at 390, 396.
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first place.2 22 In some ways, the Ukraine of the late 1990s is exceptional. Over sixty percent of the respondents indicated that they
thought government did nothing to fight corruption, and twenty-five
percent reported a personal experience with corruption. 2 2 3 Yet parts of
the world today are similar or at risk of becoming so.
There are also ongoing, large-scale empirical investigations into the
effects of corruption perceptions. One revealing study uses the 2oo8
Gallup World Poll to reach 78,000 people in ninety countries. 2 2 4
Among several bracing conclusions, Bianca Clausen and her coauthors
find that corruption perceptions have an independent effect on willingness to support violence as a means of change and willingness to
exit the political jurisdiction.2 25 This influence of perceptions is not as
strong as that of reported corruption experiences, and the authors are
rightly concerned that corruption perceptions are more vulnerable to
reverse causation than are reported corruption experiences. 226 But the
relationship between high corruption perceptions and attitudes toward
violence and exit seems to hold independent of the effect on confidence
in government (corruption perceptions are associated with low confidence, as well). These findings suggest that widespread corruption
perceptions have several potentially destructive consequences, perhaps
including an environment of cynicism in which actual corruption

thrives. 2 27

Scholars are now trying to pin down the relationship between corrupt appearances and practices. An important attempt by Professors
Wonbin Cho and Matthew F. Kirwin concentrates on seventeen countries in Africa. 22 8 The authors describe a vicious circle in which cor-

222 The authors studied several information sources and their effects on perception, such as
media and friends. Unsurprisingly, a respondent's reported experience with corruption strongly
influenced corruption perceptions. See id. at 390.
223 Id. at 384.
224 See Bianca Clausen et al., Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from
a Global Survey 2 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 5157, 2009).
225 See id. at 24. Even controlling for kvetch proxies. See id. at 14-16.
226 A respondent's reported corruption perceptions might be a function of that person's disapproval of incumbent policies. There is somewhat less reason to think that a respondent is more
likely to report actual corruption experiences based on other such variables, although it is possible, especially in ambiguous situations.
227 See Alvaro Gonzdlez et al., The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms pt. 5
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4394, 2007) (concluding that firms' corruption
perceptions adjust slowly to experiences); Lavall6e et al., supra note 2oo, at 16 (finding that corruption perceptions and experiences are associated with lower trust in political institutions in the
African countries studied, although the negative effect of perceptions weakens as access to services degrades while the negative effect of experiences rises).
228 Wonbin Cho & Matthew F. Kirwin, A Vicious Circle of Corruption and Mistrust in Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Micro-Level Analysis i (Afrobarometer, Working Paper No. 71,
2007).
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ruption experiences and perceptions feed each other.2 2 9 They test the
theory with survey data, homing in on access to health care and education. Isolating causal pathways is a major challenge, and the authors
had only cross-sectional data. But Cho and Kirwin's results are consistent with a prophetic role for corruption expectations, albeit initially
built on reported corruption experiences. "[T]he experience of corruption decreases popular satisfaction with government service delivery in
basic health care and education sectors," the authors conclude, "and
perceptions of an unjust government service delivered by corrupt public officials motivate[] citizens to pay a bribe or give a gift to obtain
public services." 2 3 0 And then the cycle repeats.
More valuable work in this area can be done - including research
on the United States, where political campaigns are relatively expensive yet corruption levels might be fairly low. Appearance of corruption can do only so much damage, after all. A lesson we can draw
from the Clausen study involves the power of actual corruption experiences. The study's data show that nationally aggregated corruption
perceptions vary widely among countries with relatively low rates of
reported corruption experiences, but the perception tends to remain
high among countries with relatively high rates of reported corruption
experiences. 23 1 In other words, a country with widespread corruption
experiences is probably stuck with a bad appearance, whereas a country in which corruption is rarely experienced might end up with a
clean reputation, a dirty reputation, or something in between. The
United States probably fits in the latter category, where several forces
might influence the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, including
campaign finance law. Total absence of the bank model in most of our
campaign finance debates is, all told, a glaring omission.

Among the potentially litigable issues today is whether and to what
extent contributions to political candidates can be restricted by law,
consistent with the judiciary's prevailing constitutional views. Litigation is pushing in a deregulatory direction while the politics of the
post-Watergate era have trended in the opposite direction. The proper
role of appearance justifications in the analysis is not yet well understood. No straightforward clock model applies to contribution caps,
and any confident depictions of the situation soon fall away. Whether
these restrictions are more like bridges or banks is open to serious debate. Evaluators probably should consider both models for the time
229

See id. at io.

230 Id. at 6.
231

See Clausen et al., supra note 224, at 30 fig.'.
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being, estimating the probability and probable effects of each. To the
extent that a bridge model cannot be ruled out, proponents of regulation should be asked why democratic transparency norms are safe or
overridden by other values. To the extent that a bank model cannot
be ruled out, critics of regulation should be asked why the theory and
emerging evidence on self-fulfilling corruption prophecies do not adequately support the status quo.
Again, efficacy questions persist regardless of which model fits best.
On the above theories, contribution limits cannot influence either participation rates or actual corruption levels without influencing observers first. And effective campaign finance regulation is costly. Contribution limits prevent donors from facilitating political messages that
they support, and prevent recipients from more easily fueling their
campaigns. Evidence on efficacy is mixed, and observers in the "money is speech" camp will demand large demonstrable benefits before
supporting inhibitions on the money trail in politics. But not everyone
holds such extreme constitutional views. Moderates will be curious
whether, for instance, eliminating contribution limits would not only
deepen public cynicism, but also increase the likelihood of illicit quid
pro quo deals. Those who frown at any system other than public financing will be even more tolerant of such regulation. These issues of
efficacy, need, and cost cannot be resolved in this space, but they are
among the relevant questions.
However you might answer them, courts have performed poorly on
nearly every one. Setting aside the disputed valuation of cash contributions in constitutional terms, judges have waded into questions of
appearance without a functional navigation system. They make untested yet confident assertions about the effects of regulation. They
myopically picture the political system as if it were a bridge in need of
public confidence but without pressing core transparency concerns.
And they have not explored self-fulfilling corruption prophecies at all.
Judicial treatment is simultaneously too permissive, insufficiently creative, and disengaged from serious empirical inquiry. Only by miraculous happenstance would these mistakes cancel out. While institutional
choice and design factors might help explain current judicial behavior,2 3 2 the argument over appearance in campaign finance litigation is
no good for anyone trying to get a serious handle on the strengths,
weaknesses, and uncertainties surrounding the issue.

232 See supra section 1I.C (discussing expertise/bias trade-offs); infra section IV.C (comparing judicial treatment of campaign finance challenges with policy debates over broken windows policing).
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B. Broken Windows Policing
i. Policy Debates and Prophetic Theories. - Debates over broken
windows policing have their own shortcomings, but they have been
remarkably different from debates over campaign finance regulation.
Aside from attracting little direct judicial attention, this policing strategy has been tightly connected to a bank model. Policymakers, scholars, and others have struggled with the question whether a concentrated government attack on perceived disorder will pay dividends in
terms of reduced crime rates. Broken windows theories are not always
detailed, but many versions indicate that neighborhood appearance
drives the reality of neighborhood safety. A critical question for this
field is whether policymakers and scholars have been too devoted to
the creative sophistication of a bank model, at the expense of models
and arguments that are simpler and more reliable.
We can begin by separating broken windows theories of misconduct and policing.2 33 In general terms, the former assert that the appearance of disorder is causally related to the amount of disorderly behavior.23 4 "[I]f a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired,"
Professors James Q. Wilson and George Kelling hypothesized, "all the
rest of the windows will soon be broken." 2 35 There is no simple and
stable definition of "disorder," but the notion is invariably connected to
neighborhood appearance. Professor Wesley Skogan's physical and social dimensions of disorder are both immediately observable:
Disorder is evident in the widespread appearance of junk and trash in vacant lots; it is evident, too, in decaying homes, boarded-up buildings, the
vandalism of public and private property, graffiti, and stripped and abandoned cars in streets and alleys. It is signaled by bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, by the presence of prostitutes and panhandlers,
by public drinking, the verbal harassment of women, and open gambling
and drug use. 2 3 6

A broken windows theory of misconduct was popularized before it
was specified, 2 3 7 and there is more than one conceivable version. Dif-

ferent versions can suggest different hypotheses regarding the rate of
misconduct, the seriousness of misconduct, and the mechanism by
which either is influenced by appearances. Thus, one might hypothes-

233 See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 278-87 (2006).
234 See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 16,

19-20 (1996).
235 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 3I (emphasis removed).
236 WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 2 (1990).
237 See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 235, at 29-32 (explaining the idea based on observations,
logic, and a few analogous studies).
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ize that the appearance of a broken window will soon lead to an outbreak of window breaking and nothing else, or that much more serious
misconduct will follow. Much scholarship concentrates on the implications for serious crime, such as homicide or robbery. 23 8 Equally significant, more than one mechanism might be at work. All versions of the
theory suppose that the appearance of a location influences behavior in
that location, but the influence might occur through norm internalization, signals about the state of the neighborhood, herding behavior
among the ill-informed, shifts in social meaning ascribed to what had
been considered misconduct, or something else. 239 Not every possible
mechanism directly implicates a self-fulfilling prophecy that runs
through shared perceptions and expectations. But a theme in broken
windows theories of misconduct is that the appearance of disorder
suggests to observers that disorder is uncontrolled, and this perception
prompts some people toward even greater disorder that is, in fact, not
controlled.
These hypotheses are not just academic curiosities. They now form
the rationale for a common policing policy. Broken windows theories
of misconduct were matched with broken windows policing strategies,
which took hold in several jurisdictions. The most notable example is
New York City.2 4 0 Following Kelling's arguments, in 1990 the city's
transit police began more aggressive enforcement of misdemeanor offenses, such as turnstile jumping. Subway misdemeanor arrests and
ejections tripled within a year, with arrestees booked quickly on a mobile "Bust Bus."2 4 1 In 1994, the strategy moved above ground. The
plan was for city police to boost arrests for fairly minor, if quite visible, misdemeanors and ordinance violations - such as graffiti, littering, panhandling, public drunkenness, public urination, and prostitu-

238 See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER 76-78 (2ooi) (reporting on rob-

bery, rape, burglary, assault, and also purse snatching); SKOGAN, supra note 236, at 73-75 (reporting on robbery); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, io5 AM. J. SOC. 603,
6o8, 628-30, 637-38 (1999) (reporting on homicide, burglary, and robbery).
239 See, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 234, at 19-20 (focusing on signals, albeit not in the
technical economic sense that involves credible communication of one's private information);
Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 233, at 281-82 & n.37 (noting the possibility of herding and information cascades); Kahan, supra note 72, at 370-71 (concentrating on social meaning).
240 See HARCOURT, supra note 238, at 1,46-51 (describing the so-called "quality-of-life initiative"); GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., Do POLICE MATTER?: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY'S POLICE REFORMS 2 (2001), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf (same).
241 See WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND
154-56 (1998) (describing the strategy); KELLING & COLES, supra note 234, at 131-32, 133 figs.4-1 & 4.2 (showing
numbers).
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The police department announced that such enforcement
measures would be "the linchpin" of its effort "to reduce crime and
fear in the city. By working systematically and assertively to reduce
the level of disorder in the city, the NYPD will act to undercut the
ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible."243 Between 1994 and 1998, adult misdemeanor arrests increased
by at least 40,000 per year.2 4 4 During the 1990s, the violent crime rate
plunged. For example, the total number of homicides in New York
City dropped more than seventy percent between 1990 and 1998 (from
2245 to 633).245
New law enforcement strategies and favorable changes in crime
rates lent credibility to broken windows theories of misconduct and
policing. It was at least possible that broken windows policing had
improved the orderly appearance of affected neighborhoods, that an
orderly appearance generated expectations that order would be maintained, and that those expectations influenced conduct in ways that
pulled reality toward those expectations. Perhaps more law-abiding
people became confident that looking out for each other and collaborating with police would be effective and acted accordingly; perhaps
more law-breaking people expected this or other inconvenient reactions to the risk of serious crime; perhaps a combination of the foregoing took place. Regardless, concerned members of a community
might feel that they have reason to attend to the visible remnants of
low-level misconduct. They might do so in the hope of preventing
more of the same, or worse. New York City had a success story.
Troubling for the
2. Causation Problems for the Bank Model. broken windows theory, however, is the fact that many large cities experienced significant drops in their recorded crime rates during the
same time frame. Not all of these cities implemented broken windows
policing. Nor was this policing strategy the only potentially relevant
event in New York City.246 Economic news was good, for instance. So
there are competing hypotheses. 24 7 Perhaps atypically large drops in
tion.242

242 See N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC
SPACES OF NEW YORK 29-32 (1994) [hereinafter POLICE STRATEGY NO. 51.
243 Id. at 5.

244 See HARCOURT, supra note 238, at 2 (noting that reported stop-and-frisk activity increased
even more).
245 See ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY 25 tbl.I.2 (2000).
246 See, e.g., KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 240, at 5, 11-12 (stating that police initiatives other than broken windows policing are difficult to track with measurable proxies and noting the
development of Compstat procedures); David Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve: Compstat
and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 421, 42433 (2003) (studying Compstat-like programs and their diffusion).

247 See, e.g., KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 24o, at 2-3 (contrasting root-cause theories and

police-impact theories); Magdalena Cerdd et al., Misdemeanor Policing, Physical Disorder,and
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crime followed atypically large increases as a matter of reversion to the
mean, not as a result of policing strategies. Perhaps a crime wave in
the 198os and early 1990s was a product of violence surrounding
burgeoning crack cocaine markets, and this storm of violence dissipated for reasons unrelated to policing. 248
No scholarly consensus has emerged on either broken windows
theories of misconduct or their affiliated policing strategies. These
ideas still attract vocal support and determined criticism. The relevant
empirical issues have, however, received sustained and constructive attention that provides the beginning for intelligent analysis.
On broken windows theories of misconduct, two leading investigations come from Skogan and Professor Bernard Harcourt. In 1990,
based on data from thirty neighborhoods, Skogan found a statistically
significant relationship between resident perception of physical/social
disorder and robbery victimization. 2 4 9 Importantly, the association
held after he controlled for racial demographics, poverty indicators,
and proxies for neighborhood stability. 25 0 "[D]irect action against disorder could have substantial payoffs," Skogan wrote. 25 1 In 2001, however, Harcourt reanalyzed the same data and offered major caveats.
He emphasized that there were missing data on robbery and disorder,
and that survey respondents were not questioned about the location of
their victimization. 2 5 2 This observation might make readers skeptical
about the statistically demonstrable impact of perceived disorder on any
crime rate. In addition, Harcourt reported that there was no statistically significant relationship between disorder perceptions and rape,
burglary, assault, or purse snatching. 253 Even if people rely on the same
visual cues for neighborhood disorder, and even if those cues are reliable and untroubling as a basis for policymaking, 254 the causal impact
of such perceived disorder on serious crime is reasonably contested. 255
Gun-Related Homicide: A Spatial Analytic Test of "Broken-Windows" Theory, 20 EPIDEMIOLOGY 533, 533 (2oo9) (collecting alternative theories).
248 See, e.g., Cerdd et al., supra note 247, at 533.
249
250
251
252

See SKOGAN, supra note 236, at 73-74, 193 tbl.A- -1.
4
See id. at 73.
Id. at 75.
See HARCOURT, supra note 238, at 60-6i.

253 See id. at 6o-61, 78.

254 Cf Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma
and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows," 67 SoC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 336-37 (2004)
(finding that racial and economic variables influence whether individuals perceive disorder).
255 See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 238, at 603, 608, 628-30, 637-38 (finding that
coded levels of disorder in Chicago neighborhoods generally do not mediate the effect of other
neighborhood characteristics on homicide, burglary, and robbery, and emphasizing the importance
of collective efficacy alone). But cf Pamela Wilcox et al., Busy Places and Broken Windows? Toward Defining the Role of Physical Structure and Process in Community Crime Models, 45 Soc.
Q. 185, 199-200 (2004) (reporting results from a cross-sectional study that physical disorder does
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Although much more could be said about broken windows theories
of misconduct, our focus on appearance-justified government decisions
suggests that we move to the evidence on policing strategies. With respect to their effect on serious crime, we can look to several relatively
recent efforts. The optimistic side is represented by George Kelling
and William Sousa's 2001 report for the Manhattan Institute. 25 6 They
investigated precincts in New York City during the 1990s and found a
large and statistically significant relationship between misdemeanor
arrests and violent crime (a combined measure of homicide, rape, robbery, and felony assault).2 57 Kelling and Sousa could not find a significant positive relationship between the violent crime rate and proxies
for cocaine use, the young male population, or poor economic conditions. 25 8 These proxy variables are by definition imperfect, as is the
correspondence between misdemeanor arrests and what can plausibly
be called broken windows policing, 259 and perhaps an omitted variable
was driving violent crime rates down. That said, the numbers are
striking. The authors claim that precincts "could expect to suffer one
less violent crime for approximately every 28 additional misdemeanor
arrests," 2 60 and that "[o]ver 6o,ooo violent crimes were prevented from
1989 to 1998 because of 'broken windows' policing." 2 6 1
On the skeptical side, the standout response is a 2oo6 law review
article by Harcourt and Professor Jens Ludwig. 262 They gathered data
to match Kelling and Sousa's. But Kelling and Sousa examined the
average misdemeanor arrest rate per precinct across the entire decade
rather than yearly changes in these arrest rates, and they did not control for the possibility of mean reversion in violent crime rates. 2 6 3 So
Harcourt and Ludwig made two notable adjustments: controlling for
the violent crime rate in each precinct leading up to 1989, and shifting
from the decade-long average arrest rate in each precinct to yearly per-

mediate the effect on violence and burglary from business-oriented public spaces, but not from
schools or playgrounds).
256 See KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 24o, at i-ii.

See id. at 5, 8-o.
258 See id. at 4-5, 8 (detailing their proxy variables as including data on hospital discharges for
cocaine-related treatment at the borough level, young male enrollment in public high schools at
the precinct level, and the number of unemployed persons at the borough level). The study found
higher unemployment associated with falling violent crime rates. See id. at 9.
259 See id. at x8 (emphasizing quality, not just quantity, of enforcement).
260 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
261 Id. at i (executive summary); see also Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks and
Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235 (2005) (studying citywide data on monthly misdemeanor
arrests and finding an association with declines in car theft and robbery but not other crimes).
262 See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 233.
263 See id. at 289-93.
257
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precinct totals for 1989 to 1998.264 With the controls for mean reversion,
more than two-thirds of the association between misdemeanor arrests
and violent crime disappeared. 265 With several more precinct-level
control variables, including changes in poverty and vacant housing,
the association shrank further and lost statistical significance. 2 6 6 And
with a shift to yearly changes in misdemeanor arrests, the association
turned around in some model specifications, with misdemeanor arrest
increases correlating with violent crime increases.2 67 These results
leave mean reversion as a plausible alternative explanation.
"[P]recincts that received the most intensive broken windows policing
during the 1990s are the ones that experienced the largest increases in
crime during the city's crack epidemic of the mid-to-late 1980S.11268
Harcourt and Ludwig also tried to find out what happens when
people are moved from disorderly neighborhoods into more orderly locations. They studied the criminal behavior of current and former residents of public housing projects in high-poverty areas. Applicant
families were randomly assigned housing vouchers that could be used
only in low-poverty areas, housing vouchers that could be used anywhere, or no housing voucher. 2 6 9 This program design could not isolate the effect of neighborhood disorder by itself, considering that moving families usually experienced changes in neighborhood affluence
and were conceivably subjected to more attentive neighbors or police
officers;2 7 0 moreover, use of the vouchers did not yield much racial integration as measured by census tract. 271 But the results are suggestive. Based on self-reports and arrest records, it seemed that the
voucher recipients had more favorable opinions of their neighborhoods
compared to the control group, but they did not show significantly different offending rates. 27 2 By reassessing the New York City data and
264 See id. at 290-93, 295 (explaining the mean-reversion control variables as 1989 violent
crimes and 1984-1989 change in violent crimes).
265 See id. at 294 tbl.2, 295. According to the table, adding either the 1989 variable or the 1989

and 1984-1989 change variable had this effect, but the 1984-1989 change variable lost statistical

significance when combined with the 1989 variable.
266 See id. at 294 tbl.2, 295-96; see also id. at 318 (explaining that census-tract data was translated into precincts).
267 See id. at 296, 297 tbl. 3 ; Errata, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407 (2007) (showing that Table 3,
Row i displays coefficients for misdemeanor arrest changes, and that these coefficients were positive in Models 2-6, although the variable lost statistical significance in Model 6). In no model for
Table 3 is there a negative and statistically significant association between misdemeanor arrest
changes and violent crime changes.
268 Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 233, at 276.
269 See id. at 301.
270 See id. at 310 n.90, 313-14 (explaining the possible difference in police monitoring).
271 See id. at 305 tbl.5 (indicating that voucher users tended to move into higher-income and
lower-crime census tracts, but not racially mixed census tracts).
272 See id. at 307-14 (noting that lower arrest rates for female youths were offset by higher
rates for other subgroups). The results reported there are based on Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Neigh-
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by assessing a randomized experiment, Harcourt and Ludwig made it
far more difficult to accept broken windows theories of disorder or of
policing - at least in the form of increasing misdemeanor arrests to
drive down violent crime.
Since then, serious empirical work on broken windows policing has
become, in some respects, more modest and targeted. First, several
studies report that the effect of broken windows policing is small compared to the effect of other measurable variables.2 7 3 This conclusion is
controversial; it depends on what counts as small when lives are at
stake and when people have only so many policy levers to pull. However, policing strategies are unlikely to account for anything approaching the whole story. Consider the recent contribution from Professor
Richard Rosenfeld and his coauthors. Taking seriously the warnings
of Harcourt and Ludwig, the Rosenfeld team controlled for mean reversion in New York City by using 1984 and 1988 precinct-level data
on robbery and homicide rates. 27 4 They still found a statistically significant association with misdemeanor and ordinance-violation arrests
from 1988 to 2001.275 On the other hand - and at least as importantly - the authors were able to credit these arrests with only seven to
twelve percent of the homicide decline and one to five percent of the
robbery decline. 27 6 Perhaps these findings should not have been surprising. Even broken windows-enthusiast George Kelling estimated,
in a less-publicized part of his work with Sousa, that misdemeanor arrests accounted for only five percent of the violent crime decline in the
city.277

borhood Effects on Crime for Female and Male Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing
Voucher Experiment, 120 Q.J. ECON. 87 (2005).
273 See Cerda et al., supra note 247, at 539 (characterizing the effect of misdemeanor arrests on
gun-related homicides between 1990 and 5999 as "small"); Steven F. Messner et al., Policing,
Drugs, and the Homicide Decline in New York City in the Iggos, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 385, 401,
405 (2007) (controlling for mean reversion and finding a statistically significant but modest effect
of misdemeanor arrests on gun-related homicides and robberies between 1990 and ggg, and also
finding a relationship between a proxy for cocaine use (cocaine-related accidental deaths in hospital records) and lower homicide rates); Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Impact of OrderMaintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: z988-200, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 355, 377 (2007) (similar for robberies and homicides); see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the i99os: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do
Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 176-83 (2004) (crediting increased imprisonment, increased numbers of police officers, deflated crack markets, and legalized abortion for widespread crime-rate
declines during the 1990s).

See Rosenfeld et al., supra note 273, at 362, 374.
See id. at 377-78.
276 See id. at 377.
277 See KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 240, at so (using 1989-1998 precinct-level data). Kelling and Sousa also report that about forty-five percent of the variance in violent crime was not
explained by the four independent variables in their model. See id. at 24 n.43.
274
275
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Second, broken windows policing probably has hope of influencing
the rate of only some serious crimes perpetrated against only some victim classes. To date, misdemeanor arrests have little or no demonstrable effect on homicides without guns. 278 One theory is that arrests for
minor crimes reduce homicide rates by getting guns off the street during coincidental searches and seizures; this theory does not reach nongun violence. 2 79 Furthermore, misdemeanor arrests seem to protect
only certain segments of the population from homicide, to the extent
that homicides decline at all. And it is worth noting that the mechanism of influence remains unclear. Misdemeanor policing might not be
getting at serious crime rates through improved physical appearance of
neighborhoods, but rather, if anything, through ordinary deterrence or
incidental police contact with arrestees who commit both minor and
serious offenses.
On the theme of limited and selective impact, consider the incisive
2010 study conducted by Professor Magdalena Cerdi and six colleagues. 28 0 This team had given up on a causal relationship between
broken windows policing and non-gun-related homicide, and, in an
earlier study, had failed to find evidence that visual disorder was the
mechanism by which misdemeanor arrests might influence more serious crime. 2 8 1 So they decided to break down New York City gun
homicides into three victim age groups at the precinct level. 2 82 When
examined from this angle, higher misdemeanor arrest rates did have a
statistically significant negative association with gun homicide between
1990

and

1999

-

but only for adult victims aged thirty-five or old-

er. 2 83 Other variables were linked to fewer gun homicides among this

278 See Messner et al., supra note 273, at 405 (separating gun-related from other homicides, then
finding a statistically significant association between misdemeanor arrests and the former but not
the latter).
279 See id. (citing Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two
Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1322 (5998)); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control in New York, in GUNS, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 191, 204-o6 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003) (concluding that stopand-frisk activity in 1998 did not predict homicide rates in 1999, with the exception of stops for
violent or drug offenses and the ensuing homicide victimization rate for Hispanics).
280 Magdalena Cerdd et al., Investigating the Effect of Social Changes on Age-Specific GunRelated Homicide Rates in New York City During the 19pos, ioo AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1107
(2010).

281 See id. at I108; Cerdd et al., supra note 247, at 536, 538-39 (finding a "weak" inverse association between misdemeanor arrests and gun homicides over time, but not via a proxy variable
for neighborhood disorder based on sidewalk cleanliness).
282 See Cerdi et al., supra note 280, at Ilo8 (excluding only Central Park and relying on medical examiner records for locations of injury and causes of death).
283 See id. at iIlo, 111-13 tbls.2, 3 & 4. The authors measured misdemeanor policing according to misdemeanor and ordinance arrests, see id. at i io8, which is not necessarily coextensive
with broken windows policing. The study does, however, control for citizen complaint rates, the
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older cohort, too: lower levels of cocaine use and higher levels of public
assistance receipt. 2 8 4 So depending on relative costs, reducing cocaine
consumption and spreading the economic safety net might be superior
to vigorous misdemeanor enforcement strategies if a city's goal is to
protect adults from homicide.
Furthermore, if the goal is to protect younger people from homicide, then the Cerdd study offers no statistically significant support for
misdemeanor policing. Instead, the study points to policies that reduce
cocaine use, increase public assistance availability, and reduce alcohol
consumption.28 5 These three variables, but not misdemeanor arrests,
were linked to falling homicide rates for victims under age thirty-five.
And recall that the first two of those three variables were also associated with lower homicide rates for adults aged thirty-five or older.
Changes in cocaine use and public assistance seem to do double duty.
Consider one comparison: an increase of one standard deviation in the
misdemeanor arrest rate was associated with a drop of 7.4 homicides
for older adults per ioo,ooo people, while an increase of one standard
deviation in public assistance receipt was associated with 10.5 fewer
homicides for young adults pluS 2.9 fewer homicides among older
adults. 286 Which policy or combination of policies is optimal cannot
be established by a single study, of course. And, unfortunately, it does
not seem that this study controlled for mean reversion. But creative
takes on the available data open wide the possibility that policing
strategies are just one modest part of the successful management of
one slice of the violent crime problem in the United States.
Finally, to the extent that broken windows theories of misconduct
deserve respect, crude versions of broken windows policing are not
responsive to the theory. The fit between misdemeanor arrests and
pleasant neighborhood aesthetics is rather poor, after all. A randomized policy experiment in Lowell, Massachusetts, speaks to this point.
Professors Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond chose thirty-four highcrime areas, divided them into matched pairs, and randomly selected
one of each pair for experimental treatment. 287 The experimental areas
ratio of felony arrests to felony complaints, and the number of officers assigned to each precinct.
See id.
284 See id. at iog, 113 tbl.4. The proxy for precinct-wide cocaine use was the percentage of
accidental deaths with positive toxicology results for cocaine. See id. at i108.
285 See id. at 1og, I111-12 tbls.2 & 3 (finding that the homicide rate for youths aged fifteen to
twenty-four fell with declining cocaine consumption and that the homicide rate for young adults
aged twenty-five to thirty-four fell with declining alcohol consumption and increasing receipt of
public assistance); see also id. at ii9 (stating that increasing incarceration rates were associated
with increasing homicide rates for youths aged fifteen to twenty-four).
286 Id. at iio9-1o, I111-13 tbls.2, 3 & 4.

A standard deviation increase for misdemeanor ar-

rests was 737 per o,ooo population, id. at irio, and for public assistance was lo.i%, id. at ihog.
287 See Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and DisorderHot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577, 582-85 (2008) (explaining that hot spots were
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received a variety of interventions that are not easily summarized. 2 8 8
They experienced some combination of (i) "order maintenance interventions," including increases in misdemeanor arrests, stops-and-frisks,
patrols, and dispersal orders for loiterers; (2) "situational strategies"
against disorder, such as cleaning and security for vacant lots, more
street lighting, more video surveillance, destruction of abandoned
buildings, and inspection of problem taverns; and (3) "'social service'
strategies" involving connections with mental health workers, homeless
shelters, and youth recreation. 2 89 This semirandomized experimental
research design helps sidestep the issue of mean reversion.
After a year, the experimental areas had nearly twenty percent fewer emergency calls than the controls, including at least thirty percent
fewer robbery, burglary, and nondomestic assault calls. 2 90 Situational
strategies showed the strongest statistical association with fewer calls;
the effect of misdemeanor arrests was less clear yet still statistically recognizable; and social service strategies failed to achieve conventional
levels of statistical significance. 2 9 1 Furthermore, and unsurprisingly, a
large majority of the experimental areas were recorded as having a decreased appearance of social and physical disorder - comprising loitering, public drinking, drug selling, homelessness, vacant lots, abandoned buildings, abandoned cars, street trash, and graffiti. 2 92 Braga
and Bond therefore oppose a simplistic "zero tolerance policing model"
focused on arrests. 293
3. Transparency Problems and Aesthetics. - On the available evidence, a sensible conclusion is that the probability of generating a
beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy with broken windows policing is uncertain, low, or confined in important ways. Even if evaluators should
be more optimistic, the difficulty in proving that a bank model dominates here should redirect attention to other possibilities. One alternative is a bridge model, in which the appearance of order exerts no
identified partly by emergency calls placed in 2004 but that the matching was "primarily . . . qualitative," id. at 583 n-5). The study also tested for displacement effects in two-block adjoining areas. See id. at 591-92, 596-97 (finding no statistically significant effect on emergency
calls).
288 See id. at 584-85 (describing the "Compstat-like process," id. at 584, in treatment areas).
The study did not measure the impact of data-driven oversight processes.
289 Id. at 585; see id. at 585-86, 594 (calculating the misdemeanor arrest increase in experimental areas compared to control areas as approximately twenty-nine percent, and noting that only
twelve of seventeen experimental areas received social service strategies).
290 See id. at 587-88, 592-93 & tbl.i (noting that social disorder was measured by researcher
counts during five-minute periods and that physical disorder was based on researcher coding of
photographs of the blocks in question).
291 See id. at 594-95 & fig.i (showing that situational strategies were statistically significant at
the .o level and misdemeanor arrests at the .io level).
292 See id. at 596 & tbl.2.
293 Id. at 6oo.
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downward pressure on serious crime rates. If that is the applicable
model, then broken windows policing becomes vulnerable to a transparency objection.
This policing strategy came with an asserted hypothesis when it
was initiated. The strategy was advertised as an effective technique
for reducing violent crime, not just urinating in public. In New York
City, for example, officials indicated that aggressive misdemeanor enforcement could reduce the rate of more serious crimes. Police Strategy No. 5, which announced the department's broken windows policing
effort, was openly concerned with resident "perception" that the city
was in decline, based not only on violent crime rates but also on "an
increase in the signs of disorder."2 94 The document goes on to note the
broken windows work of Wilson, Kelling, and Skogan:
By examining the Wilson-Kelling hypothesis in more than 40 cities, Wesley
Skogan has found that disorder is indeed the first step in what he terms
"the downward spiral of urban decay." Fear exacerbated by disorder
causes people to abandon [public spaces] .

. ,

and even leave the city alto-

gether.... NYPD will act to undercut the ground on which more serious
crimes seem possible and even permissible. 2 95
As statistics on serious crime began looking more and more favorable during the 1990s, some prominent officials and observers credited
broken windows policing. As the mayor put it in 1998: "We didn't be-

come the City people most want to live in and visit by encouraging an
atmosphere of disorder and disrespect for the rights of others.

. .

. We

have made the 'Broken Windows' theory an integral part of our law enforcement strategy. ... The broken windows theory works." 2 96 The former head of the transit police and police department wrote in the same
year: "We were proving the Broken Windows theory."2 97 Indeed, the
Kelling and Sousa study discussed above attracted media attention. 298
Such promotion and credit attribution indicates a transparency
problem, to the extent that ordinary people became overly persuaded
that broken windows policing drove violent crime down. Many New
York City residents do seem to have held high regard for the policing
strategy and the theory of disorder behind it. A poll conducted for the

294 POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 242, at
4.
295 Id. at 4-5.
296 Rudolph W. Giuliani, The Next Phase of Quality of Life: Creating a More Civil City (Feb.

24, 1998), http://www.nyc.gov/html/rwg/html/98a/quality.html.
297 BRATTON, supra note 241, at i56 (discussing transit authority policy); see also id. at 228-29
(discussing crime declines and Police Strategy No. 5 but emphasizing that it was only one of
many NYPD strategies).
298 See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 233, at 274-75 (collecting media reports); see also
KARMEN, supra note 245, at xii-xiii (stating that the media orthodoxy was to give credit to
NYPD).
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is on point.299 It found over seven-

ty percent support for a broken windows theory of crime.3" Similarly,
the police department's overall quality-of-life enforcement strategy
garnered a sixty-six percent approval rating,3 0 1 with similar levels of
support across racial lines. 302 Part of this popular support surely is
based on a belief that broken windows policing helped reduce violent
crime. According to a 2004 report from the National Research Council, "[t]here is a widespread perception among police policy makers and
the public that enforcement strategies (primarily arrest) applied broadly against offenders ccmmitting minor offenses lead to reductions in
serious crime," even though "[r]esearch does not provide strong support
for this proposition."3 0 3 More recent empirical research adds nuance to
the picture, as discussed above, but a gap remains between broken
windows policing as promoted and as tested.
No clean excuse fully pardons this appearance/reality gap. Like
campaign finance regulation, the situation involves policy as advertised to ordinary citizens, not just to enemies of the state. Moreover,
justifications for broken windows policing do not include fooling potential lawbreakers into believing that misdemeanor arrests cause lower serious crime rates. However vague, the theory behind broken windows policing turns on the response to neighborhood appearance and
not the response to assertions that those appearances cause changes.
We are left with a situation in which the connection between the policing strategy and serious crime has been at least arguably overstated to
the general public, which has at least arguably overestimated the
strength of that link.
The magnitude of this transparency problem is not especially great,
however, and probably less troubling than the possible appearance/reality gap for political corruption. The broken windows transparency issue involves overclaiming about the causal effect of a policing strategy, rather than misleading the public about violent crime or
misdemeanor arrest rates. Perhaps no one was lulled into a failure to

299 See Harold Takooshian & Richard H. Tashjian, Citizen Attitudes Toward Police and Crime,
2oo1, in CITIZENS CRIME COMM'N OF N.Y.C., CRIME, POLICE, AND THE COMMUNITY 4

(2001). The survey was conducted before 9/11. See CITIZENS CRIME COMM'N OF N.Y.C., supra,
at ii-iii.
300 See Takooshian & Tashjian, supra note 299, at 6; id. app. B tbl.i (showing fifty percent responding "definitely" and only eight percent "not at all").
301 See id. at 6 (noting that thirty-nine percent "definitely" approved and twenty-seven percent
"probably" approved). Respondents opposed enforcement regarding street vendors and jaywalking, albeit slightly, but they supported other order-maintenance policing initiatives. See id. app. B
tbl.4 .
302 See id. at 8, app. B tbl. .
3
303 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING 229 (Wesley
Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004); see also Braga & Bond, supra note 287, at 579.
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take appropriate precautions on account of this policing strategy. In
addition, the disparity between information insiders and information
outsiders might be small. In New York City, the strategy was publicly
announced and its effect is subject to testing. Although officials surely
have special access to valuable information, professional empiricists
have acquired useful data and are using it to critique the policy. Ordinary citizens are not expert statisticians, but they can bear some
responsibility for mismatches between popular perception and the demonstrable effects of a high-profile policing strategy.
Resolving this particular transparency issue decisively is less important than identifying it as a relevant normative issue. The question
becomes pressing as soon as broken windows policing or any other
government decision moves away from the bank model and toward
the bridge model. The above discussion illustrates the significance of
appearance/reality relationships to sensible normative evaluation. At
the same time, broken windows policing was not promoted solely on
its predicted effect on serious crime, nor was the strategy sold as a onedimensional plan to maximize misdemeanor arrests. There always was
much more to the broken windows debates. Indeed, doubts about a
self-fulfilling prophecy plus an arguable transparency problem should
direct attention toward a model that is simpler.
Striking out the complications of bank models and bridge models
returns us to clock models - even if we doubt that policing will beneficially change the social meaning of throwing rocks through windows,
and setting aside any benefits to the politically influential from simply
expressing condemnation of disorder through law.
There is a
straightforward case for a brand of broken windows policing that is no
deeper than aesthetics. Part of this policing strategy was meant to improve the appearance of neighborhoods according to the tastes of the
mainstream, majority population. To the extent that the strategy
changes local optics in the intended direction, gains in well-being will
be achieved even if the strategy does absolutely nothing to change the
rate or seriousness of misconduct. Most people seem to find graffiti
ugly, loitering discomforting, and public urination obnoxious. If it effectively targets these problems, broken windows policing could be
worth the cost without any benefit other than aesthetic comfort for
mainstream residents.
Changing the atmosphere was always part of the mission for broken windows policing, and this change does not strictly require lower
violent crime rates. From the beginning, Kelling and Wilson were interested in a cure for urban anxiety. They thought police officers
walking their beats could reduce "the fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disre-
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putable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks,
addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed."30 4 They did make bolder causal claims regarding crime rates,
and some people are not queasy around panhandlers. A notable lack
of tolerance unites popular desires to sweep up the trash on account of
ugliness and to sweep out less-valued people on account of anxiety.
But no doubt large majorities of city residents prefer neighborhoods
without litter, graffiti, and broken windows, regardless of the crime rate
and the people who frequent those locations. Broken windows theories
of misconduct and policing were partly founded on these sensibilities.
The aesthetically focused versions of these theories do not suffer
from the same challenges involving efficacy, causation, and transparency. Few doubt that law enforcement can have an effect on the rate
of window breaking and, if officials take time to fix windows that are
broken, the aesthetic gain becomes uncontroversial. Equally obvious,
a direct response to neighborhood aesthetics is basically impervious to
transparency concerns. The policy and its success are defined by what
people perceive. What you see is what you get. And in this case
people will perceive largely the same thing, even if they will disagree
at the margin over what counts as beautiful and what counts as ugly.
"American conceptions of the appropriate level of public order have
changed dramatically over time,o30 S Skogan concedes, but "the evidence suggests that [many forms of disorder] are not experienced differentially . . . and that major economic, social, and lifestyle divisions in
urban areas are not reflected in real differences over appropriate levels
of order."30 6 In any event, the capacity of policing strategies to influence the relevant aesthetics is a fairly straightforward proposition to

test.
At the same time, simplistic versions of broken windows policing
are poorly designed for refurbishing shabby neighborhoods. A zerotolerance policy for misdemeanor and code violations, even if it were
realistic, is not a solution to ugliness or even to visible signs of disorder. "[A]rrest strategies do not deal directly with physical conditions,"
Braga and Bond observe.3 0 Something like a real estate policy would
do much better. "[D]ealing with disorderly conditions requires an array of activities, such as securing abandoned buildings, removing trash
from the street, and managing homeless populations, which are not

304 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 235, at 30.
305 SKOGAN, supra note 236, at 5.
306 Id. at 9. For warnings that people convert perceptions of poverty and the presence of racial

minorities into perceptions of disorder, see Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 238, at 336.
307 Braga & Bond, supra note 287, at 6oo.
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captured in one-dimensional misdemeanor arrest measures." 30 s In fact,
arrests can worsen the aesthetic. Arrests themselves tend to be disorderly. While they indicate that police officers care, arrests also indicate
something troubling for the officers to care about. Furthermore, if it
appears that members of disadvantaged groups are feeling the brunt of
the policing effort, yet another negative aesthetic consequence must be
factored in along with complaints of domination and other injustices. 30 9
The above is a reminder that aesthetic justifications are not uncontroversial. People disagree over the right aesthetic, and some policies
are not especially well suited to achieving pure gains toward beauty
and comfort. Broken windows policing recalls some of these difficulties. An aesthetic justification for the policy is less convenient than a
demonstrable self-fulfilling prophecy in which the appearance of order
matches the reality measured by crime rates of all kinds. Under those
conditions, we could identify consensus goals and a policy that left little space for transparency problems. Unfortunately, existing empirical
evidence is not as comforting as broken windows theories. At this
point, probably the best defense of broken windows policing involves a
practice and an argument trained on aesthetics.
C. Reflections
The foregoing debates are different in several noteworthy respects.
Arguments over campaign finance regulation often migrate to the
courts in the form of constitutional litigation, while broken windows
policing remains a policy debate with little direct judicial review. Furthermore, the former debate proceeds largely on theory as relevant
evidence develops, while the latter features a sizeable body of on-point
empirical work already. Not only do we think that recorded murder
and robbery rates are more reliable than are estimates of political corruption (a notoriously private activity, even when precisely defined),
but causation empiricists working on U.S. policy have a head start on
broken windows policing. And although the analysis of both issues
308 Id. at 579; see also RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS 22

(distinguishing the effects of different types of neighborhood disorder or incivilities on
crime and decline, and indicating different kinds of policy responses); Harcourt & Ludwig, supra
note 233, at 282 ("[T]he broken windows hypothesis [of misconduct] is, in principle, consistent
with a variety of potential policy levers, ranging from changes in policing to community organizing."); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 238, at 638 & n-36 ("Attacking public disorder through
tough police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to
reduce crime ..... Id. at 638.).
309 See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: CriminalEnforcement and
Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1249 (2000); id. at
1267 ("One might infer that minority communities tend to lose confidence in police fairness as
order-maintenance policies become more stringent."); Ralph B. Taylor, Incivilities Reduction Policing, Zero Tolerance, and the Retreatfrom Coproduction: Weak Foundationsand Strong Pres(2001)

sures, in POLICE INNOVATION 98, bo7-o8 (David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006).
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can be improved with attention to appearance/reality relationships, the
respective recommendations are quite different. The campaign finance
debate has been pinned down by a bridge model and closed off from a
bank model, while the broken windows debate suffers from something
like the opposite problem - along with an underappreciated clock
model perspective, which is not similarly applicable to the campaign
finance context.
We might wonder whether these differences intimate a sensible division of labor across institutions. On the one hand, judiciaries are not
well built to process complex empirical issues, while academics are
supposed to do so, and policymakers might be expected to do the best
they can. On the other hand, the labor is not actually divided so neatly.
Judges repeatedly make empirical assertions in campaign finance litigation. Courts are toying with efficacy and causation questions, just
not in anything close to expert fashion.3 10 Simultaneously, the policymaking process is not doing an especially good job with the contested
data on which broken windows theories depend. One might believe
that policy-related empirical questions are most legitimately determined by legislative politics or bureaucratic processing, but those institutions show their own shortcomings. And judicial "tampering" with
empirical questions is not likely to end soon.
Even if we should generally prefer that academics and officials
grapple with statistics while judges perform other tasks, many appearance justifications have a peculiar character. When an appearance is
proffered for something more than its intrinsic value, officials can be
called on to defend themselves without enjoying impermeable deference and without suffering implacable skepticism. 3 1' The risk that officials will perniciously manipulate the appearance of their operations
motivates the creation of significant safeguards, including some outsider oversight. But the questionable competence of outside evaluators,
along with the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy, indicates that
oversight should come with a measure of restraint. Whether the authority for oversight is lodged in a judiciary or some other institution,
it will often make sense to seriously test appearance justifications, empirical components and all. Obviously the outcome may depend on
contested value commitments, including the constitutional value as310 Casual judicial empiricism is in no way restricted to campaign finance cases. See, e.g., Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 104, at 175o-6o (casting doubt on judicial understanding of the
impact of voter identification laws); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 840-43 (2009)
(doubting the Court's ability to characterize risk uncontroversially based on a high-speed-chase
video); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP.
CT. REV. 153, 155 (detecting an "ever-widening gap between Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence . . . and scientific findings about the psychology of compliance and consent").
311 See supra section M.C.
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signed to campaign donations and the human value of living in a
neighborhood free from "disorderly conduct" (or constant monitoring
therefor). But for those who are not so certain or not extraordinarily
wedded to those particular values, the problems of transparency and
the emerging empirical lessons of the best scholarly efforts will become
critically important. Even if you doubt that the broken windows policy debate will improve, we easily can imagine judges becoming curious about self-fulfilling corruption prophecies. 3 12
Whatever is the likely or optimal combination of decisionmakers,
any conscientious observer should have an intelligent set of questions
and lessons from the discussion above. One lesson is that attention
should be smoothed out across the different models for appearance/reality relationships. A comprehensive judgment on broken windows policing or campaign finance regulation must consider more than
one model. Concentrating on the exciting possibility that graffiti
cleanup can result in fewer murders will shunt aside the risks of public
misinformation, along with the simple benefits of aesthetic pleasure
and a sense of safety. Concentrating on the importance of public confidence to an effective government will miss transparency threats to
the most rudimentary versions of democracy, along with the possibility
that contribution limits help ameliorate those concerns by preventing a
corruption-inducing self-fulfilling prophecy.
None of this is to argue that all of us should be struggling with all
of these questions to the same extent. Nor is it true that everyone engaged in these debates pretends to be offering comprehensive judgments when they examine one part of the overall analysis.3 13 But at
least someone should be paying serious attention to multiple aspects of
these issues. The general analytic framework suggested above is a
kind of checklist for determining whether significant aspects are being
left out, regardless of the appearance-based justification on offer. The
prominent campaign finance and broken windows debates reviewed
here illustrate differing highs and lows in attention levels.

312 Serious judicial concern about transparency and contribution limits is not highly likely, in
my judgment. Judges are partly an extension of the political system and not the leading candidates for attacking its legitimacy. Furthermore, charging widespread corruption might reinforce
the perceived need for more regulation, which several Justices plainly oppose, and the Justices
who are more tolerant of regulation might not want to effectively concede that law has been ineffective so far. That said, mainstream judges with different ideological commitments might be
willing to point out that defenders of campaign finance regulation cannot be sure what the actual
corruption level would be if current regulations were invalidated. Those judges also might be
willing to consider the risk of a destructive self-fulfilling corruption prophecy.
313 For a responsibly limited take on an empirical conclusion, consider Messner et al., supra
note 273, at 407, which closes with a caution about resource allocation issues and the negative
effects associated with order-maintenance policing.
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At a more micro level, there are lessons about self-fulfilling prophecies. They are curious phenomena that operate on sometimes hazy
and touchy social mechanics. It takes creativity to see possibilities for
self-fulfilling prophecies, perhaps running in different directions, and
the dynamics can be exciting. A strong self-fulfilling prophecy can
cure a transparency concern. Indeed, when the feared consequences
fall into the catastrophic categories of political corruption or homicides, even small probabilities of self-fulfilling prophecies will substantially boost the expected beneficial consequence of law. No regulatory
interest more subtle than fighting a downward spiral into governmentfor-sale or extreme physical insecurity is necessary. Avoidance of
transparency questions, furthermore, can sidestep contentious normative questions, such as the trade-off between ineffective government
institutions and accurate public perception, or the aesthetic and other
value of vigorous enforcement of quality-of-life laws.
But strongly influential self-fulfilling prophecies are not well understood today. High hopes have been unfulfilled in more than one
setting, such as teacher expectations and broken windows policing. In
those fields, beneficial effects triggered by physical appearance or
widespread belief remain believable yet modest and sensitive to context, as far as we can tell. They are real and qualified. Perhaps the
growing work on self-fulfilling corruption prophecies will have a similar trajectory - ingenuity followed by excitement and then moderation. In any event, one challenge is to remain open-minded about the
applicability of bank models without undue enthusiasm. Campaign
finance litigation shows poorly on the former virtue, while some broken-windows-policing advocacy tips over into the latter vice. Another
challenge is to preserve the conditions for progress in understanding
self-fulfilling prophecies. In the policing context, we have the advantage of local variation, which provides data for quasi-experimental
empirical research, not to mention a few randomized policy trials. In
the campaign finance situation, however, there is a chance that judges
will diminish policy diversity by shrinking the policy space through
uniformly deregulatory constitutional doctrine. Thus far, meaningful
candidate contribution limits are still acceptable to judges. But there
is reason to worry that additional constitutional constraint will be imposed in an information-forfeiting manner.
From this cautionary note, I want to reissue several warnings about
the general framework deployed here. First, it does not cover every
relationship between appearance and reality over time. Instead I have
emphasized select relationships that seem especially relevant to appearance arguments involving government decisions. Second, certain
value choices will have to be inserted before yielding conclusive judgments. The analysis above attempts to avoid telling you exactly what
to value and, no doubt, even readers with shared values will interpret
the strength of various appearance arguments differently. Third, the
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framework draws on different models for appearance/reality relationships, but it does not instruct the user how to choose across those
models. Often more than one model may be in action. My objective
has not been to solve the problem of model selection but rather to
promote its importance. Finally, I want to emphasize that no two debates can reveal terribly much about a practice as widespread as appearance justifications for official decisions. Even a complete treatment of campaign finance and broken windows would not say
everything worth knowing about appearance arguments. Additional
work is warranted. And I encourage inspired readers to start seeing
appearance arguments everywhere - and for what they really are.
CONCLUSION

This Article suggests a workable distinction between the elusive
concepts of appearance and reality, along with several ways in which
the two can be related. Often we think that reality is insulated from
any influence that can be linked to appearance, but sometimes an appearance becomes the basis for conduct that fosters a corresponding
reality over time, and sometimes the concepts collapse in the first
place. Grasping these relationships is important for reaching sensible
normative judgments about appearance-based justifications. The evaluative issues are comparatively simple when appearance and reality
are essentially the same. As always, cost, necessity, and efficacy of appearance management will be relevant, but still other questions arise
when appearance and reality might diverge. If reality seems insulated
from appearance, the key question involves transparency: whether, for
example, attempts to build public confidence can be justified despite
the risk of a gap between the apparent and actual conduct of officials.
If instead reality might be a function of appearance over time, the
transparency issue becomes subordinate to another causal question:
whether, for example, the appearance of good behavior will help produce a beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy.
These ideas were illustrated with debates over campaign finance
regulation and broken windows policing, but any number of other applications could have been used. The basic point is not so much about
which applications are most interesting or the proper conclusion to
draw about any particular argument. Answers to those questions will
depend on individual ideological commitments that I do not pretend to
reconcile. Instead I have presented a general framework for analyzing
appearance-based justifications in government decisions that is compatible with a large spectrum of values. We need this. Every day, decisions are made in order to generate good looks, including goodlooking government operations. We ought to have a thoughtful set of
questions to ask about those appearances, any underlying reality, and
the connection between the two.
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